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This thesis consists of two parts. I will first explain briefly what Rawls' political 
liberalism is and why he advocates such a form of liberalism in (I). Then in (II)，I will try to 
show that Rawls fails to set up his political liberalism since its main idea, namely, the 
reasonable overlapping consensus, is not realizable. On the one hand, Rawls is not 
convincing in imposing a moral responsibility on the citizens in a modem democratic society 
to endorse his political conception ofjustice (which is the focus of the reasonable overlapping 
consensus). On the other hand, he, in my opinion, fails to show that they can affirm such a 
conception unanimously. 
Indeed, I think that if the appropriate explanations of the reasonable pluralism are 
really the burdens ofjudgment as suggested by Rawls himself, then it is impossible that all 
reasonable citizens can affirm the political conception of justice even though it is 
freestanding as he supposes it to be. Furthermore, I will try to show that the political 
conception ofjustice contains comprehensive liberal elements. If my argument is plausible, 
the political conception of justice is not freestanding at all. Accordingly, the citizens cannot 
affirm it unanimously due to the effect of the burdens of judgment. Finally, I will show that 
Rawls fails to establish the outweighing power of the political virtues and hence, I find 
neither the possibility nor the stability of a well-ordered society convincing. 
I f I am right, the utopia of the political liberalism, a well-ordered society (in which the 
reasonable overlapping consensus is realized), is a mere illusion. Eventually, the best we can 
achieve may be a modus vivendi only. 
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Whv not Political Liberalism Bv Ting-Yat Chui 
Introduction 
A modem democratic society is characterized by an inevitable feature of pluralism. It 
is a plurality of different or even incompatible reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In such a 
society, citizens cannot reach a common agreement on a comprehensive doctrine without 
employing an oppressive state power. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to achieve unity in a modem democratic society because no 
commonly agreed comprehensive doctrine can legitimately be adopted as the basis of the 
unity. However, for any society, there must be some kind of unity. Therefore, although it is 
difficult to find out a basis of the unity for a modem democratic society, this work seems to 
be indispensable for the ones who believe that such a society is worth supporting. 
Rawls takes up this challenge in his second book, Political Liberalism} In the book, 
he tries to answer the question, "[h]ow is it possible that there may exist over time a stable 
and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines" [PL, p. xxvii，emphasis added). If this question can be 
answered, the problem of social unity in a modem democratic society appears to be solvable 
too. 
Rawls proceeds in two stages of exposition when answering this question. In the first 
stage, he presents his political conception of justice as a freestanding conception. This 
ensures that it is independent of any comprehensive doctrine and thus, compatible with 
different doctrines in a democratic society. 
1 The abbreviations of John Rawls' writings are as follows: 
ATOJ-A Theory of Justice (Cambridge; Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
PL - Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
The hardcover edition of the second book was published in 1993. Since Rawls adds a new "introduction to the 
Paperback Edition" and "Reply to Habermas" in the paperback edition, PL in this thesis refers to the paperback 
edition. 
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In the second stage, Rawls argues that the citizens in a modem democratic society can 
affirm his political conception of justice unanimously through the reasonable overlapping 
consensus. This provides a stable basis for a well-ordered society because 
[i]n such a consensus, the reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception, each 
from its own point of view. Social unity is based on a consensus on the political 
conception; and stability is possible when the doctrines making up the consensus are 
affirmed by society's politically active citizens and the requirements of justice are not 
too much in conflict with citizens' essential interests as formed and encouraged by 
their social arrangements {PL, p. 134) 
If the reasonable overlapping consensus is realized, the well-ordered society is just 
(since it is regulated by the political conception of justice) and stable (because of the 
reasonable overlapping consensus). It is not a modus vivendi in which the stability is 
sustained merely by the balance ofpower. 
In such a society, even if the balance of power disappears, no one will force others to 
affirm his own comprehensive doctrine because all the citizens endorse the political 
conception ofjustice whole-heartedly (this is why Rawls thinks that it is stable for the right 
reasons). Ifthis is true, the question mentioned above can be answered and the foundation of 
the social unity is secured because it is "based on a consensus on the political conception". 
Actually, I believe Rawls is right in asserting the inevitability of the reasonable 
pluralism in a democratic society. I also admit that a secured basis of unity is indispensable 
for a democratic society. Nonetheless, I do not agree that his political conception ofjustice is 
an eligible candidate for such a basis. In other words, I doubt if his political conception of 
justice can fulfill the task set by himself. In this thesis, I will try to show why his work is 
unsuccessful. 
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This thesis is made up of two parts. In (I), I will try to display briefly what Rawls' 
political liberalism is and why he needs to recommend it. In (II), I would like to argue that the 
main idea in PL, that is, the reasonable overlapping consensus, is not realizable. Indeed, I 
think that Rawls is unreasonable and too optimistic in claiming that the overlapping 
consensus can be established in a modem democratic society. If I am correct, the best which 
can be achieved in such a society is a modus vivendi. The ambition of PL is only an illusion 
of a modem liberal. 
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(I) John Rawls，Political Liberalism 
1. Why political liberalism? 
Why not A Theory of Justice? In fact, this is a misleading question. Rawls has never 
admitted that he wants to abandon the theory of justice advanced in ATOJ. Indeed, the two 
principles of justice are still adopted in his new book, Political Liberalism, though they 
should be understood in quite a different way. 
，„_ 
Simply speaking, PL is a reformulation of ATOJ. Thus, in order to understand it, we 
must first understand the inadequacy of ATOJ. In this section, I will try to explain why Rawls 
has to recast his theory. 
A. Reasonable Pluralism 
The main problem oiATOJ, according to Rawls, is that it does not take the feature of 
a modem democratic society, namely, the reasonable pluralism, into account adequately. This 
is a feature which will not pass away in the foreseeable future. As he says: 
A m o d e m democratic society is characterized .. . by a pluralism of incompatible yet 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is aff irmed by citizens 
generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future one of them, or some 
other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens. (PL, p. 
xviii) 
2 As he says, "a main aim o fPL is to show that the idea of the well-ordered society in Theory may be 
reformulated so as to take account of the fact ofreasonable pluralism" {PL, Italics added, p. xliii). 
4 
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This passage tells us that in a modem democratic society where the citizens can freely 
exercise their reason, pluralism is unavoidable. It is a pluralism of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines and can only be removed by the autocratic use of state power.^ 
For Rawls, reasonable pluralism is the main and permanent feature of a modem 
democratic society.^ It is impossible that all (or most) of the citizens would affirm a 
comprehensive (or partially comprehensive) doctrine voluntarily in such a society. Although 
they may be coerced into affirming one comprehensive doctrine, this is not acceptable to 
Rawls because of his devotion to the liberal principle of legitimacy.^ Furthermore, it is 
obvious that an acceptance made by force is not a real acceptance at all since if the force is 
removed, pluralism will surely occur again. 
But why is reasonable pluralism inevitable? Why does political liberalism assume that, 
“for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is 
the normal result of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime" (PL, p. xviii)? 
This should be explained by what Rawls calls “the burdens of judgment", the sources 
of the reasonable disagreement. Briefly, they are: 
• The difficulty to access and evaluate the complex and conflicting evidence bearing on the 
case. 
• Disagreement on what the weight of different evidence should be. 
• Our vague concepts leading to indeterminacy. 
• The fact that our experience shapes the way we assess evidence and weigh values. 
3 PL, pp. 303-304. Besides, the term 'comprehensive' has its special meaning in PL. If a conception covers all 
recognized virtues and values in one precisely articulated system, it is said to be fully comprehensive. If it 
contains only a number of loosely articulated nonpolitical values and virtues, it is called partially 
comprehensive. Please refer to PL, p. 13. 
‘PL, p. 136. 
5 The idea of 'reasonable' and the liberal principle of legitimacy are very important in political liberalism. I will 
discuss them in detail later. 
5 
Whv not Political Liberalism Bv Ting-Yat Chui 
• The difficulty in making an overall assessment due to different kinds of normative 
considerations of different force on both sides of an issue. 
• Great difficulties in setting priorities and making adjustments in being forced to select 
among cherished values.^ 
These burdens explain why the common agreement of all citizens on one 
comprehensive doctrine is impossible even though they are making judgment rationally 
without appealing to self-interest or committing logical error. Because of them, the reasonable 
pluralism in a constitutional democratic regime is normal and inevitable. 
If there is no comprehensive doctrine which can be affirmed by all in a democratic 
society, then the work of ATOJmxxst be reformulated. As Rawls admits: 
[T]he serious problem I have in mind concems the unrealistic idea of a well-ordered 
society as it appears in Theory. An essential feature of a well-ordered society 
associated with justice as faimess is that all its citizens endorse this conception on the 
basis of what I call a comprehensive philosophical doctrine ... I think, that the text 
regards justice as faimess and utilitarianism as comprehensive, or partially 
comprehensive, doctrines. {PL, p. xviii) 
As shown in this passage, Rawls thinks that the text in v4rOJregards justice as faimess 
as comprehensive, or at least partially comprehensive. This is not acceptable because it does 
not work (at least in a right way)^ in a democratic society. It has the same problem as Kant's 
or Mill's liberalism: since these doctrines are comprehensive, the voluntary affirmation of all 
citizens on any one of them is impossible (because of the burdens of judgment). The 
insistence on the possibility of the common affirmation not only is unrealistic but also is 
6 For a full account of the burdens of judgment, please refer to PL, pp. 56-57. 
7 "in a right way" has a special meaning in PL. It is usually associated with the problem of stability. I will 
discuss it later. 
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unreasonable because it fails to recognize the pluralistic feature of a democratic society.^ 
Thus, Rawls has to recast his doctrine in ATOJ in order to make his theory acceptable to all 
the reasonable citizens in a modem democratic society.^ 
B. Stable for the Right Reasons 
Because of the reasonable pluralism, Rawls has to solve the problem of stability in 
ATOJ. It is a serious problem when the theory is applied to a democratic society. This is why 
he says that the main concern of PL is to make the first and third part oiATOJ consistent: 
Indeed, it may seem that the aim and content of these lectures mark a major change 
from those of Theory.…，one must see them as arising from trying to resolve a serious 
problem intemal to justice as faimess, namely from the fact that the account of 
stability in part III of Theory is not consistent with the view as a whole. (PZ, pp. xvii-
xviii) 
Why does Rawls think that justice as faimess in ATOJ has an intemal problem 
concerning stability? As I have mentioned, since it is a comprehensive doctrine, it cannot gain 
a public justification of the citizens in a pluralistic society. Owing to this, it is illegitimate to 
use such a doctrine in regulating a democratic society. Even ifone can force others to affirm 
it, the resulting society will not be stable in a right way. It is a mere “modus vivendV'^^ only. 
The term ‘stable, is not as straight forward as it appears to be. Actually, "finding a 
stable conception is not simply a matter of avoiding futility" {PL, p. 142). Rawls wants the 
8 Rawls states explicitly in Lecture II of PL that a reasonable citizen should not force others to affrnn their own 
comprehensive doctrine. 
9 One may ask why Rawls insists that his theory must be accepted by all in a democratic society. In fact, this 
insistence is also due to his devotion to the liberal principle oflegitimacy. I will explain it in detail later: 
Roughly speaking, Rawls thinks that a society which is regulated by his political conception ofjustice is stable 
in a right way because such a conception can gain a public justification and thus, satisfy the requirement of the 
liberal principle of legitimacy. 
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society founded on justice as faimess be stable in a right way instead of a modus vivendi 
which may be stable but not for the right reasons. This is because a workable compromise 
between existing and known interests is not acceptable even though it may be stable]i 
In order to make the society founded on his conception of justice stable in a right way, 
Rawls establishes a political conception of justice. In PL, he transforms the comprehensive 
theory of justice in ATOJ into a political conception of justice because he thinks that though 
the citizens cannot affirm one of the comprehensive doctrines generally, they can affirm his 
political conception of justice instead.^^ 
According to Rawls, the political conception of justice is “a moral conception and 
affirmed on moral ground" (PL, p. 147) which can be supported by the citizens in a 
democratic society who hold different (even incompatible) reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines. These citizens will not withdraw their support of it even if the relative strength of 
their view eventually becomes dominant/^ If this is true, a well-ordered society (which is 
regulated by the political conception ofjustice) is not simply a modus vivendi. 
If the political conception of justice can really gain support from the citizens in the 
way described by him, a reasonable overlapping consensus is said to be achieved.^^ And the 
focus of this consensus is exactly the political conception of justice. When this is done, the 
10 For the meaning o£‘‘modus vivendf\please refer to PL, p. 147. 
11 See John Rawls, "Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus", reprinted in The Idea ofDemocracy 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. 
Roemer, p. 259. Because of this, I think that Kymlicka is wrong in claiming that Ottoman Turks (Muslim) 
system, which he calls "group-right model", is an alternative type ofreligious toleration to that in the modem 
democratic society. This is because the religious toleration in the Muslim system is possible only when different 
groups are under the mle of the highest sovereign. It is the existence ofTurks and the exercise oftheir political 
power that make the toleration possible. Ifthat sovereign collapses, it is not clear whether the balance of 
different cultures in that system can be maintained. Please refer to Will Kymlicka, "Two Models ofPluralism 
and Tolerance", in Toleration (Princeton; New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), ed. David Heyd. 
Apart from this aim, there is another aim which PL wants to achieve. It is, to take the different "reasonable 
liberal political conceptions of justice"(Pi^, p. xlviii) into account. For Rawls, justice as faimess is not the only 
possible political conception ofjustice which can be applied in a democratic society. Some other liberal political 
conceptions can achieve this too. Thus, he has to consider them in PL. However, since my task in this thesis is 
mainly to examine Rawls' political conception ofjustice. I will not take them up here. 
13 Please refer to PL, p. 148. 
14 The idea of the reasonable overlapping consensus is an extremely important idea in PL, I will discuss it in 
more detail later in this chapter. 
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society regulated by the political conception of justice is stable (in a right way) and just 
(endorse the political conception ofjustice). 
Rawls' presentation in PL is divided into two stages. After showing the political 
conception of justice as a freestanding conception, he keeps on showing that the overlapping 
consensus can provide stability for a democratic society in a right way]^ ln the rest of this 
part, I will show what political liberalism is and how it fulfills Rawls' aim in the face of the 
reasonable pluralism in a democratic society. 
2. What is political liberalism? 
What is political liberalism? This is not a simple question. Rawls presents his theory in 
a very detailed and complicated way. In the following, I will only try to present the main 
ideas in PL. 
A. The aim of PL 
I have somehow touched the aim of PL above, now, I will discuss it in detail. 
In the Introduction to the hard cover edition, Rawls claims that the problem ofpolitical 
liberalism is, "[h]ow is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of 
free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines?" (PL, p. xxvii. I call this Q1). 
One can see from this question that Rawls tries to find out a possible way which can 
make a pluralistic society founded on his theory to be stable and just. In order to fulfill this 
151 would like to quote here what Rawls thinks is not "political in the wrong way": "its form and content are not 
affected by the existing balance of political power between comprehensive doctrines. Nor do its principles strike 
a compromise between the more dominant ones." {PL, p. 142). 
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task, Rawls has to work out a political conception of justice because there is no 
comprehensive doctrine that can serve as a basis of public reason and justification. According 
to him, a just and stable society can only be regulated by a political conception of justice that 
all citizens might be reasonably expected to endorse/^ Therefore, the central task of PL is to 
establish an appropriate political conception of justice which can be used to regulated a well-
ordered society legitimately. 
Rawls has explicitly divided Q1 into two questions so that he can answer it step by 
step. The first question is: "What is the most appropriate conception of justice for specifying 
the fair terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, and as fully 
cooperating members of society over complete life, from one generation to the next?" {PL, p. 
3. Qla) and the second one is: “What are the grounds of toleration so understood and given 
the fact of reasonable pluralism as the inevitable outcome of free and institutions?" (PZ, p. 4. 
Qlb) 
Obviously, the answer to Qla and Qlb together constitute that to Q1. Rawls believes 
that Qla can be answered by his political conception of justice while Qlb the reasonable 
overlapping consensus." 
With the purpose of answering Qla and Qlb systematically, Rawls proceeds in two 
stages ofexposition. First, he sets out "the first stage of the exposition ofjustice as faimess as 
a freestanding view" and it "gives the fair terms of cooperation among citizens and specify 
when a society's basic institution are just" (corresponding to Qla). Second, he "considers 
16 Please refer to PL, pp. 135-137. 
17 . 
In the introduction to the paperback edition, Rawls puts Q1 in a more ambitious and vigorous way: "How is it 
possible for those affirming a religious doctrine that is based on religious authority, for example, the Church or 
the Bible, also to hold a reasonable political conception that supports a just democratic regime?" {PL, p. xxxix. 
Qrevl). Indeed, the change in the formulation o f Q l is to emphasize the concept ‘stable in a right way'. This is 
because the answer to Q1 can be an existing modem democratic society which is dominated by Kant's or Mill's 
Liberalism doctrines. And it is possible for such a society to exist over time. Nevertheless, this is not enough 
because it may at best be a modus vivendi. Rawls wants all reasonable citizens to accept his political conception 
ofjustice whole-heartedly. This is different from a mere compromise or a modus vivendi. He wants them to be 
able to hold both their own comprehensive doctrines and the political conception of justice at the same time 
without inconsistency. 
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how the well-ordered democratic society of justice as faimess may establish and preserve 
unity and stability given the reasonable pluralism characteristic of it" (PL, pp. 133-134. This 
is corresponding to Qlb). I will try to demonstrate briefly these two stages in the following. 
B. Two stages of the exposition 
a. The first stage of the exposition 
i. The political conception ofjustice 
In order to understand the first stage of exposition, we should clarify what Rawls 
means by "the political conception ofjustice". In PL, he has given a clear description ofit: 
Political Liberalism characterizes a political conception o f j u s t i c e by three features: 
a. It applies in the first instance to the basic structure of society (assumed in the case 
o f j u s t i c e as fa imess to be a democratic society). This structure consists o f t h e main 
political, economic, and social institutions, and how they fit together as one unif ied 
system of social cooperation. 
b. It can be formulated independently of any particular comprehensive doctrine, 
religious, philosophical, or moral. While we suppose that it may be derived f rom, or 
supported by, or otherwise related to one or more comprehensive doctrines (indeed, 
we hope it can be thus related to many such doctrines), it is not presented as 
depending upon, or as presupposing，any such view. 
c. Its fundamental ideas - such ideas in political liberalism as those ofpol i t i ca l society 
as a fair system of social cooperation, of citizens as reasonable and rational, and free 
and equal - all belong to the category of the political and are familiar f rom the public 
political culture of a democratic society and its traditions of interpretation of the 
constitution and basic laws, as well as of its leading historical documents and widely 
known political writings. (PL, p. 376) 
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Feature a. tells us that the subject to which the political conception of justice is applied 
is the basic structure of society]8 Feature b., on the other hand, demonstrates the difference 
between a comprehensive doctrine and the political conception of justice. The latter is indeed 
independent of any comprehensive doctrine though citizens may freely think that it is derived 
from, supported by, or related to their own comprehensive doctrines (this is why Rawls calls 
the political conception of justice freestanding). This feature is important because it ensures 
that the political conception of justice does not assert any specific comprehensive doctrine 
and so citizens in a modem democratic society can endorse it even though they hold different 
comprehensive doctrines. 
Feature c. is essential for Rawls to claim that the political conception of justice is 
freestanding. It tells us that the fundamental ideas in this political conception belong to the 
political category and familiar to the political culture of a democratic society. In other words, 
these fundamental ideas are widely shared in a democratic society. This is necessary because 
in order to make a conception to be endorsed by all reasonable citizens, Rawls must start from 
some commonly shared ideas which are held by all. Otherwise, it is impossible to build up a 
conception which can answer Rawls' question because there is no guarantee that the citizens 
will accept it. If the conception of justice consists of the fundamental ideas prevailing in the 
democratic society, the ground of its acceptance can be much more secured. 
Nevertheless, what are the fundamental prevailing ideas contained in Rawls' political 
conception ofjustice? For Rawls, there are two companion fundamental ideas in fact. “One is 
the idea ofcitizens as free and equal persons; the other is the idea of a well-ordered society as 
a society effectively regulated by a political conception ofjustice" (PL, p. 14). Hence, simply 
speaking, they are those liberal ideas of person and society. 
181 will not discuss the basic structure in detail here. One can refer to PL, Lecture VII. 
12 
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Rawls believes that there is no need to affirm any comprehensive doctrine before 
accepting these ideas because they are independent of any comprehensive doctrine. This 
property is due to the fact that they are implicitly contained in the tradition and public 
political culture of a democratic society^^. Moreover, because of them, other basic ideas^^ can 
be systematically connected in the political conception of justice. 
Beginning with the fundamental idea of society as a fair system of cooperation, Rawls 
assumes that citizens have all the capacities that enable them to cooperate in a society. Then, 
he goes on to see what kind of principles can guarantee a society to be a fair system of 
cooperation. This is accomplished with the idea of the original position. 
The idea of the original position is controversial since its first appearance in ATOJ. 
Many think that it embodies a metaphysical conception of person.^^ However, Rawls denies 
this condemnation. He thinks that we should treat the original position only as a mode of 
representation which can provide us a way to find out what principles of justice should be 
chosen when we are in a fair system of cooperation. 
In the original position, people are covered by the veil of ignorance. This eliminates 
the unfair bargaining power of some of the members. As Rawls says, "The reason the original 
position must abstract from and not be affected by the contingencies of the social world is that 
the conditions for a fair agreement on the principles of politicaljustice between free and equal 
persons must eliminate the bargaining advantages that inevitably arise within the background 
institutions of any society from cumulative social, historical, and natural tendencies" (PL, p. 
23). This ensures that the principles chosen by the parties are the ones which are not bias to 
any group or member and thus, they are appropriate principles of justice. 
''PL, p. 15. 
2° Rawls says, "[t]he basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense ofjustice and 
for a conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of judgment, thought, and inference connected with 
these powers), persons are free. Their having these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully 
cooperating members of society makes persons equal" {PL, p. 19). 
21 The representative of this kind of criticism is of course Michael J. Sandel, the writer of Liberalism and the 
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Rawls believes that the principles of justice obtained in the original position can best 
fit the implicitly shared idea of society as a fair terms of cooperation. Furthermore, if they 
10 
pass the test of the reflective equilibrium , then the political conception which is exemplified 
by these principles is the most reasonable political conception of justice for the citizens.^^ 
This, in addition to its freestanding property, makes itself suitable for being a focus of the 
reasonable overlapping consensus which I will discuss in the second part. 
ii. Political constructivism 
Before considering the idea of the overlapping consensus，it is worth stating here that 
the specific view adopted by Rawls in his treatment of the political conception of justice is a 
constmctivist view. It is a view about the content and structure of a political conception of 
• .• 24 
justice. 
It is called constmctivist because when the reflective equilibrium is satisfied, the 
principles ofjustice can be represented as the outcome of certain procedure which is modeled 
by the original position. In other words, they are constructed by a certain procedure which is 
acceptable to all the rational and reasonable citizens inside a democratic society. 
Moreover, because of the specific feature of the original position, Rawls believes that 
“ [t]his procedure, we conjecture, embodies all the relevant requirements of practical reason 
and shows how the principles ofjustice follow from the principles ofpractical reason in union 
with conception ofsociety and person, themselves ideas of practical reason" (PL, pp. 89-90). 
Limit of Justice. 
22 This means that they can "articulates our more firm considered convictions of political justice, at all levels of 
generality, after due examination, once all adjustments and revisions that seem compelling have been made" 
{PL, p. 28). 
23 PL, p. 28. 
24 PL, pp. 89-90. 
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Accordingly, he claims further that the constmctivist view can provide political 
liberalism with an appropriate conception of objectivity.^^ And the political conception of 
justice constructed from such procedures can neither assert nor deny the truth of any 
comprehensive doctrine. This is necessary because given the fact of the reasonable pluralism, 
citizens cannot commonly agree on any comprehensive doctrine, moral values, or sacred text. 
We should thus adopt a constmtivist view to specify the fair terms of social cooperation as 
given by the principles ofjustice. 
In fact, the bases of this view lie in the fundamental ideas of the public political 
culture, citizens' shared principles and the conceptions of practical reason^ Rawls believes 
that if the procedure can be formulated correctly (through the original position), the citizens 
should be able to accept its principles and conceptions though they hold different 
comprehensive doctrines. 
b. The second stage of the exposition 
i. The reasonable overlapping consensus 
After showing the first stage of presentation in PL, it is time to enter the second stage 
and demonstrate its central idea: reasonable overlapping consensus. The second stage of 
Rawls' presentation of justice as faimess concerns the problem of stability. According to 
Rawls, stability involves two questions. The first one is, "whether people who grow up under 
just institutions acquire a normally sufficient sense of justice so that they generally comply 
with those institutions" (PZ, p. 141). This is answered by what he calls moral psychology. I 
will not take this up here. The second question is that "whether in view of the general facts 
25 PL, p. 89. The term 'objectivity' has its special meaning in PL. For detail, Please refer to Lecture III in PL. 
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that characterize a democracy's public political culture, and in particular the fact of pluralism, 
the political conception can be the focus of an overlapping consensus" {PL, p. 141). Rawls 
thinks that his political conception of justice can be such a focus and once the overlapping 
consensus is realized, the stability ofthe society is sustained. In this part, I will show in detail 
what Rawls means by reasonable overlapping consensus. 
For all societies, there must be some kind of unity. However, in a modem democratic 
society which is pluralistic in nature, citizens hold different comprehensive doctrines (as well 
as conceptions of good). There is indeed no doctrine which can be the basis of the unity of 
such a society. In other words, no comprehensive doctrine or conception of good can be used 
to connect all citizens together. 
In order to make a reasonable unity ofthe well-ordered society possible, Rawls tries to 
make his political conception of justice eligible for such a basis. In fact, he thinks that the 
reasonable basis of the social unity can be presented in three clear points: 
a. The basic structure of society is effectively regulated by one of a family of 
reasonable liberal conceptions of justice (or a mix thereof), which family includes the 
most reasonable conception. 
b. All reasonable comprehensive doctrines in society endorse some member of this 
family of reasonable conceptions, and citizens affirming these doctrines are in an 
enduring majority with respect to those rejecting each of that family. 
c. Public political discussion, when constitutional essentials and matters of basic 
justice are at stake, are always, or nearly always, reasonably decidable on the basis of 
reasons specified by one of a family of reasonable liberal conceptions of justice, one 
ofwhich is for each citizen the most (more) reasonable. {PL, pp. xlix-l) 
These points show that the social unity is not based on any comprehensive doctrine. 
Among these three points, the second one tells us what the real nature of the unity is. It is in 
26 PL, pp. 89-90. 
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fact a unity based on the political conception of justice. This unity is possible because the 
majority will be connected by the political conception through their voluntary support for it. If 
this is realized, the political conception of justice makes the social unity possible even though 
n 
the reasonable pluralism is inevitable. 
But how is such unity possible? According to Rawls, it is through the reasonable 
overlapping consensus. If the citizens in a democratic society hold different comprehensive 
doctrines on the one hand while whole-heartedly affirm the political conception on the other, 
the reasonable overlapping consensus is said to be realized and the unity in the above quoted 
passage is possible. 
Rawls believes that the political conception of justice can be endorsed by different 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines from their own viewpoints. He illustrates this point with 
an example of three different views which would endorse the political conception of justice 
through the overlapping consensus. 
The first view endorses the political conception because its religious comprehensive 
doctrine leads to the principle of toleration and accepts the fundamental liberties of a 
constitutional regime. The second view affirms the political conception on the basis of some 
comprehensive doctrines like those ofKant and Mill. The third one is a pluralistic view which 
is not systematically unified and includes a large family of nonpolitical values indeed.^^ 
Rawls demonstrates the nature of the overlapping consensus by these three different 
views. Since they are quite popular in a democratic society, it appears that if they can affirm 
the political conception of justice from their own points of view, the overlapping consensus 
may be possible. 
When the overlapping consensus is realized, these three views' endorsements are 
wholehearted and not merely a compromise. This is because they accept that the political 
27 It should be noticed that a well-ordered society is not a 'political community' in which all citizens are 
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conception ofjustice is reasonable and they endorse it from their own view points. They will 
not withdraw their support for the political conception of justice even if the balance of the 
power among them disappears. Despite having power to enforce their own doctrines, they will 
not do so: 
[T]hose who affirm the various views supporting the political conception will not 
withdraw their support of it should the relative strength of their view in society 
increase and eventually become dominant. So long as the three views are affirmed and 
not revised, the political conception will still be supported regardless of shifts in the 
distribution of political power.. .This feature of stability highlights a basic contrast 
between an overlapping consensus and a modus vivendi, the stability of which does 
depend on happenstance and a balance of relative forces. (PL, p. 148) 
From this passage, one can also see why the stability is sustained when the 
overlapping consensus is realized. Indeed, the reason is simple: because all reasonable 
citizens will not withdraw their supports for the political conception ofjustice, the society will 
of course be stable. Although there may be some who refuse to endorse it, they are minority 
and cannot undermine the stability of a well-ordered society. 
Furthermore, Rawls clearly points out the nature of the overlapping consensus, 
namely, the depth, the breadth and the specificity of content of the reasonable overlapping 
consensus. Regarding its depth, the overlapping consensus goes down to the fundamental 
liberal ideas of person as free and equal and society as a fair system of cooperation, within 
whichjustice as faimess is worked out. These ideas are prevailing in a democratic society. As 
for its breadth, it covers the content of the political conception (justice as faimess) and it 
connected by comprehensive doctrine or conception of good. Please refer to PL, pp. 40-41. 
28 Please refer to PL, p. 145. 
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applies to the basic structure of a society? Its specificity simply refers to justice as faimess 
(the political one)， 
However, one may ask why “those who affirm the various views supporting the 
political conception will not withdraw their support of it should the relative strength of their 
view in society increase and eventually become dominant"? Obviously, it is not enough to 
optimistically says that they will not do so when the overlapping consensus is realized. In 
order to be convincing, Rawls must handle the problem of conflicts between the political 
conception ofjustice and the comprehensive doctrines. 
The answer can be seen from a passage in PL. Since this is very important, I think it is 
better to quote it here despite its considerable length: 
The virtues of political cooperation that make a constitutional regime possible are, 
then, very great virtues. I mean, for example, the virtues of tolerance and being ready 
to meet others halfway, and the virtues of reasonableness and the sense of faimess. 
When these virtues are widespread in society and sustain its political conception of 
justice, they constitute a very great public good, part of society's political capital. 
Thus, the values that conflict with the political conception of justice and its sustaining 
virtues may be normally outweighed because they come into conflict with the very 
conditions that make fair social cooperation possible on a footing of mutual 
respect. • .The other reason political values normally win out is that severe conflicts 
with other values are much reduced. This is because when an overlapping consensus 
supports the political conception, this conception is not viewed as incompatible with 
basic religious, philosophical, and moral values. We need not consider the claims of 
political justice against the claims of this or that comprehensive view; nor need we say 
that political values are intrinsically more important than other values and that is why 
the latter are overridden. Having to say that is just what we hope to avoid, and 
achieving an overlapping consensus enable us to do so. {PL, p. 157) 
2 9 f O / , p . 149. 
'° PL, p. 164. 
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This important passage gives us two reasons which can sustain the stability of a well-
ordered society even though there are conflicts between the political conception ofjustice and 
some non-political values. Firstly, since the virtues of political cooperation are great virtues 
(great in the sense that they are the very conditions that make fair social cooperation 
possible), the non-political values which conflict with the political conception of justice they 
sustain may be normally outweighed. Secondly, when an overlapping consensus is achieved, 
the political conception of justice is viewed as compatible with the basic religious, 
philosophical, and moral values by the citizens. Thus, the conflicts between them can be to a 
great extent avoided and the society will be stable. 
From the above discussion, we can see that if Rawls is right in arguing for the 
possibility and the stability of the reasonable overlapping consensus, Q1 will be answered 
because such a consensus provides a way which ensures the existence of a stable and just 
society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, 
and moral doctrines. 
ii. Public reason 
Ifthe overlapping consensus is realized, the basis ofpublic reason is said to be secured 
as well and the conflict can be solved by negotiation. This is because "fundamental political 
questions can be settled by the appeal to political values expressed by the political conception 
endorsed by the overlapping consensus {PL, p. 169). 
In such a society, the citizens appeal to the public reason instead of the non-public 
ones when settling basic political questions. The content of the public reason is formulated by 
a political conception ofjustice which is broadly liberal in character and independent of any 
comprehensive doctrine: 
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The aim of justice as faimess, then，is practical: it presents itself as a conception of 
justice that may be shared by citizens as a basis of a reasoned, informed, and willing 
political agreement. It expressed their shared and public political reason. But to attain 
such a shared reason, the conception of justice should be, as far as possible, 
independent of the opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that 
citizens affirm. {PL, p. 9. Italics added) 
This political conception of justice, served as the focus of the overlapping consensus, 
is used in determining the acceptable agreement on political issues. As Rawls explicitly 
claims that a political conception is a guiding framework of reflection and deliberation which 
helps us reach political agreement on the basic questions of justice and the constitutional 
essentials.3i In other words, the political conception of justice provides publicly justified 
resources for all in a democratic society to settle the basic questions of justice and the 
constitutional essential. This is why Rawls thinks that the reasonable overlapping consensus 
which focuses on the political conception of justice can provide a firm foundation for the 
public reason. Actually, if there are no commonly shared resources, conflicts cannot be 
resolved peacefully and legitimately. 
C. Liberal Principle of Legitimacy 
After the demonstration of Rawls' two stages of the exposition, I think it is worth 
considering briefly another main idea of Rawls in PL, namely the liberal principle of 
legitimacy. As I have said above, for Rawls, a society is stable in a right way only when it 
satisfies the liberal principle oflegitimacy. This tells us how important this principle is. 
31 Please refer to PL, p. 156. 
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In order to understand this principle, we should at first know what "political 
relationship" is in a modem democratic society because the principle of legitimacy is 
connected with these two features: 
First, it is a relationship of persons within the basic structure of the society into which 
they are bom and in which they nohnally lead a complete life. 
Second, in a democracy political power, which is always coercive power, is the power 
of the public, this is, of free and equal citizens as a collective body. {PL, p. 216) 
The second point shows that in a democratic society, the political power is the 
coercive power of all equal citizens as a collective body. This, in addition to the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, makes it unreasonable to exercise the state power to coerce others to do 
something that we ourselves cannot reasonably accept. 
The liberal principle of legitimacy is the principle which expresses this view. As 
Rawls claims, "Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably 
be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable 
and rational. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy" (PL, p. 217). 
Thus, for Rawls, when the government of a democratic society wants to exercise the 
coercive state power on the citizens, it must use the power in a way which satisfies the 
principle oflegitimacy. Otherwise, it is illegitimate and unacceptable. 
Here, one should bear in mind that Rawls has given no argument to support the 
reasonableness of the liberal principle of legitimacy. Its reasonableness arises from the 
reasonableness of the idea of person. As he himself claims, “I note that there is, strictly 
speaking, no argument here. The preceding paragraph in the text simply describes an 
institutional context in which citizens stand in certain relations and consider certain questions, 
and so on. It is then said that from that context a duty arises on those citizens to follow the 
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criterion of reciprocity. This is a duty arising from the idea of reasonableness of persons as 
characterized at p. 49f ' (PL, p. xlvi, f.n. 14. Italics added).^^ 
The liberal principle of legitimacy is indeed extremely important in Rawls' political 
liberalism since his devotion to it leads him to revise the doctrine in ATOJin order to suit the 
modem democratic society. It constitutes the liberal ideas of person and society. And this is 
why it tells us that it is illegitimate to use state power in forcing others to affirm any 
comprehensive doctrine. If we view society as a cooperative structure between equal and free 
citizens, then when we need to settle political questions, we must appeal to the freestanding 
political conception of justice which can be reasonably endorsed by all instead of a 
comprehensive doctrine. 
The above is a brief account of what Rawls' political liberalism is. I hope one can get 
the general picture of political liberalism now. In (II), I will discuss whether his political 
liberalism succeeds or not. 
32 
In this passage, the "criterion of reciprocity" refers to the liberal principle of legitimacy itself. Rawls 
explicitly tells us that the reasonableness of this principle is founded on the reasonableness of the liberal idea of 
person which is one of the fundamental ideas in the political conception of justice. Nonetheless, I think that the 
"idea of reasonableness of persons" leads to difficult problems for PL which are not easy to solve. I will discuss 
this in (II) too. 
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(II) Why not Political Liberalism 
In this chapter, my main concem is to show Rawls is not convincing in arguing that 
the reasonable overlapping consensus can be realized in a modem democratic society, which 
is pluralistic in nature. Indeed, I believe that his well-ordered society is at best a modus 
vivendi since he fails to include those non-liberal doctrines in such a society. 
I f I understand Rawls correctly, his political liberalism is unsuccessful in fulfilling the 
task set by itself because it fails to provide a realistic way for a pluralistic society to be just 
and stable in a right way.^^ 
1. The reasonable overlapping consensus? 
As I have shown in (I), Rawls gives us an example of the reasonable overlapping 
consensus containing three different views. They are willing to endorse the political 
conception ofjustice because they affirm one ofthe following doctrines: 
• Comprehensive liberal moral doctrine such as those ofKant or Mill 
• Religious doctrine which accepts the principle of toleration and the idea of 
fundamental liberties 
• A pluralist view in which different values are not systematically unified^^ 
33 It fails to answer both Q1 and Qrevl which I have mentioned in (I). 
''PL, p. 145. 
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Rawls believes that all these three views can “overlap on the political conception" 
CPL, p. 146) and he tries to reply the objections to the overlapping consensus after giving us 
this example. 
Similar to Rawls, I believe that these three views can form an overlapping consensus 
focusing on the political conception of justice. However, one should ask what the 
significance of this consensus is. Does this mean that other doctrines in a democratic society 
canjoin the overlapping consensus as well? 
Let us take a look on these three views. For the first one, its affirmation of the 
political conception of justice is due to its liberal nature. Although their scopes are different 
(one is comprehensive while the other is political), it is easy to predict that it can abide by the 
two principles of justice (which are the content of the political conception of justice) in the 
political aspect. Moreover, because of its assertion of the priority of right, it will not force 
others to affirm its own conception of good even in the non-political aspects. 
The religious doctrine held by the second view is similar to some kinds of religion 
like today's Christianity in the United States. It endorses the principle of toleration and 
accepts citizens to share fundamental liberties no matter what social status or religion they 
have. It is also easy to imagine that this view will affirm Rawls' political conception of 
justice since it has been somehow liberalized.^^ As Rawls tells us, toleration comes out as a 
long term practice after the war of religion. In order to survive in a democratic society, these 
religions have to accept the fundamental liberal ideas (like those of person and society) 
though they might not endorse them wholeheartedly at the very beginning. 
Finally, the third view which holds partially comprehensive doctrine is quite 
interesting. I believe that this view is popular in a democratic society. Owing to the 
pluralistic nature of a democratic society, no absolute moral or religious authority can be 
35 One may doubt its affirmation is just a compromise or more vigorously, whether this view really holds its 
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accepted by all. Many people choose to endorse particular values (instead of a whole 
comprehensive doctrine) which they prefer to or are familiar with. Since these values come 
from different comprehensive doctrines in a modem democratic society，this view is pluralist 
in nature. 
Nevertheless, no matter how pluralist this view is, once it does not affirm any one of 
the comprehensive doctrines, it may not resist accepting the political conception of justice. 
Remember, the political conception ofjustice contains the fundamental liberal ideas which 
are widely shared in a democratic society. When one grows up in such a society, he may not 
find it difficult to accept these ideas. Even a clever man like Aristotle does not think that 
slavery is morally wrong. 
Therefore, if the overlapping consensus only needs to contain these three views, I 
believe Rawls is successful in showing that it is realistic. Nonetheless, this does not mean the 
same consensus can be successfully established in today's democratic society. Indeed, the 
aim of a well-ordered society is to contain most of the doctrines (even if they are 
unreasonable) in a democratic society which may not be so liberal at alL^^ This is equal to 
saying that Rawls wants the citizens in a democratic society, who hold different or even 
incompatible comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of good, to affirm liberal 's priority of 
right in the political aspect and put their non-political values in the bracket when 
considering political questions. 
Accordingly, it is not enough for Rawls to give such an example. Indeed, if his 
example contains some extreme views like those of Islam, I doubt very much that the 
overlapping consensus can successfully be demonstrated. As Bernard Williams says, "Rawls' 
religious doctrine. I will discuss this details later. 
36 As Rawls says, "a society may contain unreasonable and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines. 
In their case the problem is to contain them so that they do not undermine the unity andjustice of society." {PL, 
pp. xviii-xix, italics added). 
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state has no way of including militant Hinduism or Islam, for instance, or the most fanatical 
17 
variants of Orthodox Judaism, and no doubt it is not sensible to expect that it should". 
Of course, when confronting such extreme cases, Rawls will not try to include them, 
he will just simply count them as unreasonable and exclude them from his well-ordered 
society. But here, one can see that Rawls' standpoint in PL is quite confusing in treating 
those extreme doctrines. 
As I quoted in footnote 36，Rawls wants to contain most of the doctrines even though 
some of them are unreasonable or mad. Nevertheless, as Williams says, Rawls' state has no 
way to include those unreasonable doctrines indeed. Rawls himself has also explicitly said 
that the doctrines which do not accept the fundamental liberal ideas of person and society in 
his political conception of justice are unreasonable, and it seems that he does not allow them 
to be included in his well-ordered society. 
In fact, Susan Moller Okin is right in pointing out this puzzling view, "[e]arly in this 
book (PL)，he several times says that while there are many reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, there will always be some unreasonable ones, which need to be ‘contained，. 
Subsequently, however, he argues that only reasonable ones will be ‘allowed’ or ‘permitted’. 
His example of those that may be discouraged or even excluded altogether include doctrines 
and associated ways of life 'in direct conflict with the principles ofjustice"'.^^ 
If this is so, in what way should we understand Rawls? In my opinion, it is 
appropriate for us to accept that Rawls does not want to include those extreme religions like 
militant Islam in his well-ordered society. In fact, Rawls has explicitly said that "a 
conception of the good requiring the repression or degradation of certain persons on, say, 
racial, or ethnic, or perfectionist grounds.. .This religion will cease to exist in the well-
ordered society of political liberalism" {PL, pp. 196-197, italics added). Thus, they are 
37 Bernard Williams, "A Fair State", in London Review ofBooks, Vol. 15, (13'\ May, 1993). 
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obviously not able to survive in a well-ordered society because they are 'unreasonable' in 
OQ 
Rawls' sense. Although Rawls has used the term ‘contain’ (the italics in footnote 36，it 
should be understood as “keep under proper control") when he taUcs about the 'unreasonable' 
doctrines, it is obvious that they will undoubtedly be excluded from his well-ordered society 
ifthey cannot be effectively controlled. 
However, even if we accept that Rawls is reasonable in excluding those extreme 
religions or comprehensive doctrines, there may still be many moderate doctrines which do 
not accept liberal conception of right in a democratic society. If Rawls only gives an example 
which contains one liberal and two 'semi-liberal' views, it is impossible for him to persuade 
others to accept that the overlapping consensus is possible. 
As I have demonstrated in (I), he has shown why the overlapping consensus is 
possible in PL apart from using an example alone. But I find most of them unconvincing. 
Indeed, I believe that his idea of the overlapping consensus is too optimistic if not 
impossible. In the following, I will concentrate on showing why his arguments are not 
successful. 
2. Why should the citizens endorse the political conception of 
justice? 
After reading PL, the first question appearing in my mind is: if the reasonable 
pluralism is really inevitable in a democratic society (except by using force), why can the 
citizens affirm the political conception of justice voluntarily while the burdens of judgment 
still exist? Does Rawls successfully argue for this? 
3s Susan Moller Okin, "Review ofPolitical Liberalism”, in American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, pp. 
1010-1011. 
^9 
“ I believe Rawls' use of this term 'unreasonable' leads to serious problem ofhis theory which I will discuss in 
the following. 
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Easy to observe, this is a practical question (‘practical’ in the sense that whether such 
affirmation can be realized is Rawls' main concem). However, before coming into a detailed 
discussion of it, we should at first clarify why Rawls thinks that the citizens should endorse 
such a political conception of justice. Although the questions of ‘should，and ‘can’ are 
intimately connected, it is possible for us to discuss them separately so as to make the 
problems internal to his view explicit. 
A. Being reasonable? 
Why should the citizens endorse the political conception of justice? For Rawls, the 
main reason is that its fundamental ideas (those liberal ideas of society and person) are 
widely shared in a democratic society. He seems to suppose that if this is the case, the 
citizens should endorse the political conception ofjustice as well. 
But why is this so? If the prevailing ideas in a society should be accepted by its 
people, then, should the people in Greece accept slavery?^^ This is of course not what Rawls 
wants to handle since his focus is a modem democratic society only. However, if he really 
thinks that the prevailing ideas in a democratic society should be accepted by its citizens, he 
must at least show the reasons and clarify why this may not be the case in other societies. 
Surprisingly, he just simply takes it for granted that it is reasonable for the citizens to accept 
these prevailing liberal ideas. Nevertheless, I think his use of the term 'reasonable' is not 
reasonable at all. 
40 This involves the problem ofrelativism which I cannot afford to take up in detail in this thesis. But I would 
like to quote here that there are some objections to Rawls on this issue. As Galston says, "When Americans say 
that all human beings are created equal and endowed with certain unalienable rights, we intend this not as a 
description ofour local convictions but, rather, as universal truths, valid everywhere and binding on all. Hideed, 
that claim is at the heart oftheir normative force. If our principles are valid for us only because we (happen to), 
believe them, then they are not binding even for us." Galston, W., "Pluralism and Social Unity" in Ethics vol 
99 (Julyl989), p. 725. ’ 
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In spite of the complicated structure of PL, the idea why the citizens should affirm the 
political conception of justice is quite simple. Let's recall the three features of the political 
conception of justice. The first feature is that the subject to which it applies is the basic 
structure of a society. The second feature is that it can be formulated independently of any 
comprehensive doctrine. Finally, the fundamental ideas in this conception belong to the 
category of politics and are familiar with the political culture, the tradition of a democratic 
society. 
Within these features, the third one is the key point why the citizens can accept such 
political conception even though they hold different comprehensive doctrines. It provides a 
basis of public justification for a political conception of justice^\ Rawls thinks that if the 
fundamental ideas in the political conception of justice can be publicly justified, the 
conception itselfcan be endorsed by the citizens too. 
Nonetheless, although these ideas are prevailing in a democratic society, obviously 
there are still some citizens not accepting them. As I have quoted from Bernard Williams, 
there may be some “militant Hinduism or Islam" who cannot be contained in a well-ordered 
society due to their own comprehensive doctrines. In order to handle these kinds of people, 
Rawls describes them with the term 'unreasonable' or even ‘mad，. 
In fact, he thinks that it is reasonable for the citizens to accept the fundamental liberal 
ideas in his political conception ofjustice. As he says: 
Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to 
propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them 
willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so. Those norms they view 
as reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore as justifiable to them; and they are 
ready to discuss the fair terms that others propose. The reasonable is an element ofthe 
idea ofsociety as a system offair cooperation and that its fair terms be reasonablefor 
41 For why Rawls wants the political conception of justice be publicly justified, please refer to (I). 
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all to accept is part of its idea of reciprocity... Reasonable persons, we say, are not 
moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which 
they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist 
that reciprocity should hold within that world so that each benefits along with others. 
{PL, pp. 49-50，emphasis added) 
From these, one can see a reasonable person in Rawls' sense is the one who is willing 
to accept the ideas of person as free and equal and society as a fair system of cooperation. 
According to him, to say that citizens are reasonable is briefly equal to saying that: 
• They are ready to propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide by these terms 
provided others do so. 
• They recognize the limit brought by the burdens of judgment. That is, their own 
view may not be justified to others who are also reasonable and rational.^^ 
The first point tells us that recognizing the idea of society as fair terms of cooperation 
is not enough. One must be willing to abide by these terms provided others will do so. The 
second point leads to the result that one should treat toleration as a political virtue. If one 
accepts that people are equal and free and acknowledge the burdens of judgment, then it is 
reasonable for him to tolerate other citizens whose comprehensive doctrines are incompatible 
with his. This point is extremely important because if all citizens are really ‘reasonable，，the 
stability of a pluralistic democratic society can be sustained. 
It is easy to observe that according to Rawls, being reasonable is a moral idea. One 
should not be unreasonable because it is morally wrong. As one of the conditions of being 
reasonable is to accept the liberal ideas of person and society, one should endorse the 
42 These 2 features ofbeing reasonable are just part ofthe idea of reasonable. The idea is fully discussed in 
detail in the Lecture II ofPL. Here, I just briefly elaborate these 2 points. 
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political conception of justice because it is morally right to accept its fundamental liberal 
ideas. 
However, is it really reasonable to simply categorize those who do not accept the 
fundamental liberal ideas as ‘unreasonable’？ Rawls simply grants the meaning of the term 
'reasonable' at the outset. And he raises no independent argument to support the moral 
responsibility in accepting these ideas. Quite obviously, his argument is circular. As Stephen 
Mulhall and Adam Swift say: 
In short, this seemingly separate argument adds no independent weight to Rawls' 
earlier claims about the very great value of the political virtues.. .it is entirely circular. 
By defining 'the reasonable' as including a commitment to a politically liberal vision 
of society, Rawls defines anyone who queries or rejects that vision as 'unreasonable'; 
but he offers no independent reason for accepting that morally driven and question-
begging definition.43 
Apart from the meaning of the term ‘reasonable’，it appears that there is no 
independent argument in PL to support the reasonableness in accepting these fundamental 
ideas.44 If this is true, it is really unreasonable and inadequate for Rawls to impose a moral 
responsibility on the citizens to endorse his political conception ofjustice. 
Besides, Rawls' idea of 'reasonable' leads to another serious problem. As Muhall and 
Swift have mentioned, his definition on ‘reasonable, and his desire to seek the public 
justification may not be compatible.^^ On the one hand, he thinks that it is reasonable to 
accept the fundamental liberal ideas in his political conception of justice; on the other, he 
wants to make his political conception of justice publicly justifiable. However, if his 
definition of the term 'reasonable' is sound, there is no need for him to seek the public 
43 Stephen Mulhall & Adam Swift, Liberals & Communitarians, 2nd edition (Blackwell, 1992), p. 238. 
44 Perhaps Rawls simply thinks that the popularity of the fundamental ideas alone is enough for supporting their 
reasonableness. However, even if this is sound, there are still problems needed to be solved. I will take this up 
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justification. This is because if the political conception of justice cannot be justified to 
someone, then he will be counted as unreasonable. And there is no need to seek his 
endorsement on the political conception ofjustice at all. 
If this is so, the work of PL seems to be superfluous. Remember, its main aim is to 
modify the theory in ATOJ 'm order to seek the public justification. If there is no need to seek 
the justification from the ones who do not endorse the political conception ofjustice (because 
they are unreasonable), why should Rawls put so much effort to argue that his political 
conception ofjustice can be the focus of the overlapping consensus? He just needs to exclude 
the 'unreasonable' people from his fair state, and the remaining ones will of course be willing 
to endorse his political conception ofjustice because they are ‘reasonable，. 
Moreover, it is worth asking further that ifthe idea of ‘reasonable’ and the need of the 
public justification are in conflict, which one is more important. Actually, Rawls' idea of 
“reasonable in accepting the fundamental liberal ideas" seems to depend on the popularity of 
these ideas. However, imagine one day, when it is discovered that the public does not accept 
the reasonableness in acknowledging these ideas, how will Rawls respond? Should he 
abandon his moral idea of 'reasonableness' or should he claim that the public is not 
reasonable and thus, morally wrong in insisting their view (and abandoning the search of the 
public justification for his political conception ofjustice)? 
This problem arises because ofRawls' devotion to both of the ideas at the same time. 
On the one hand, he has given us his devoted moral idea of reasonableness at the outset. On 
the other hand, he wants his theory to be publiclyjustified in a democratic society (due to his 
dedication to the liberal principle of legitimacy). But the problem is, what he treats as moral 
may not be publiclyjustifiable. This tells us that the relationship between morality and public 
justification is not so harmonious. There may be an unavoidable tension between them. 
later. 
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In PL, Rawls seems to neglect this unavoidable tension between morality and public 
justification. This is because he optimistically thinks that the political conception of justice 
(which is a moral conception) can be publicly justified in a democratic society. Thus, it can 
satisfy both ideas at the same time. Those who do not endorse it are simply unreasonable. 
Hence, there is no need for him to resolve the tension because there is no tension at all. 
But, as I have shown, the fact is that neither can Rawls argue for his idea of 
reasonableness successfully (circular argument) nor can the fundamental ideas in the political 
conception of justice win public justification (sure there are some religious doctrines which 
do not accept these ideas). As a result, the work of PL obviously fails because the fulfillment 
of both ideas are the necessary conditions for it to be completed and unluckily, Rawls has 
satisfied none ofthem. 
Frankly speaking, I believe that it is quite impossible for one to establish a moral 
conception which can be endorsed by all in a pluralistic society (even though its scope is 
political only). One may think what is morally right can be publicly justified simply through 
open discussion. But this is surely not always true especially in a democratic society. In such 
a society, there are many different answers to the question of what morality is because there 
are different conceptions of good.^^ An action which is thought to be morally right by, says, 
an Utilitarian may not be justified to a Christian. This feature is caused exactly by the 
burdens of judgment which are suggested by Rawls himself. 
B. Prevailing ideas? 
45 Liberals & Communitarians, pp. 242-245. 
461 believe that there is a close relationship between moral rules and conception ofgood. Liberalism fails to 
respect this relationship and treats the conception of right and good separately. This is unacceptable and 
unreasonable. I will discuss it later. 
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As I have demonstrated, Rawls argues for the reasonableness of his political 
conception of justice in the following way: since the fundamental ideas are widely shared in 
a democratic society, the citizens should endorse the political conception of justice which is 
built upon them. This is simply because it is reasonable for the citizens to do so. 
Hence, i fhis use of the term 'reasonable' is really unreasonable, he fails to convince 
us that the citizens should endorse his political conception of justice. Nevertheless, granted 
that he can successfully argue for the reasonableness in accepting these prevailing 
fundamental ideas based on the fact that they are prevailing, there is still a problem. 
As one can easily observe, in a democratic society, the political culture is constituted 
of many ideas. Among them, there are many conflicts which cannot be solved peacefully. For 
instance, there may be some ideas of utilitarianism or religion prevailing in the democratic 
political culture which are not compatible with Rawls' liberal ideas of person and society. 
Why should one accept his ideas but not the others? As Dworkin says: 
No set of political principles constructed by a philosopher can fit all parts of any 
community's traditions and history perfectly because, as Rawls of course 
acknowledge, the history of any community includes controversy as well as tradition. 
Two very different political conceptions, which would justify very different 
controversial political decisions now, might each fit the record and rhetoric of a 
community's political history roughly equally well.^ ^ 
Ifthere are really many conflicting ideas in the democratic tradition, then which set of 
ideas should be accepted by the citizens? Which set is more reasonable if they are 
conflicting? If one endorses some prevailing ideas which are incompatible with the 
fundamental ideas in Rawls' political conception of justice, how can Rawls convince him to 
endorse the political conception of justice provided that the burdens of judgment exist? 
47 Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality (Salt Lake City: University ofUtah Press, 1990), p. 32. 
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Rawls also seems to put inadequate effort in showing that his fundamental ideas are the most 
reasonable ones for the citizens to endorse. 
He may reply that one should accept the fundamental ideas because they best fit our 
moral convictions (remember the reflective equilibrium). Nevertheless, to be honest, there 
may also be many prevailing ideas which can fit our moral convictions very well. 
FoJ"instance, I might believe that it is natural for some to be very rich in a capitalistic 
s. 
y 
societyju3 because they are smart. This is a fair game. If one is smart, he will win in such a 
C 
Q 
game. W % should I accept the difference principle? In fact, the famous Chamberlain's ..•�‘ �J 、一* 
example given by Robert Nozick tells us that it seems to be quite unreasonable for the 
Government to redistribute our properties.^^ It also contains intuition held by many citizens 
that is to a certain extent incompatible with Rawls' principles of justice. Thus, it is obviously 
not enough for Rawls to simply claim that the citizens should accept his ideas instead of 
others because of their moral convictions. 
Furthermore, in Dworkin's passage quoted above, he is concerned with the conflicts 
between different political conceptions of justice. He thinks that different political 
conceptions may justify different political decisions or fit roughly equally well into 
community's political history. If this is so, regarding the difficult political questions, what 
decisions should the citizens support if they endorse different political conceptions ofjustice? 
Actually, the decisions based on one's political conception of justice may be unable 
to be publiclyjustified. Eventually, no political conception ofjustice can provide resources in 
settling thomy political questions in a way which is acceptable to all. This means that even a 
well-ordered society may not be stable in a right way. 
Rawls ofcourse knows this very well, he tries to respond in this way: 
48 Please refer to Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Blackwell, 1974), pp. 161-163. 
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However, disputed questions, such as that of abortion, may lead to a stand-offbetween 
different political conceptions, and citizens must simply vote on the question. Indeed, 
this is the normal case: unanimity of views is not to be expected. Reasonable political 
conceptions of justice do not always lead to the same conclusion, nor do citizens 
holding the same conception always agree on particular issues. Yet the outcome of the 
vote is to be seen as reasonable provided all citizens of a reasonably just constitutional 
regime sincerely vote in accordance with the idea of public reason. (JPL, pp. lv-lvi) 
However, can this solve the problem? Rawls' suggestion of voting leads to several 
problems. 
First, in this passage, Rawls says that citizens should "sincerely vote in accordance 
with the idea ofpublic reason" (as I have mentioned in (I), the content of public reason is the 
political conception of justice). But there are some problems such as abortion (Rawls' 
passage which I quoted above concerns exactly this problem) which may not be able to be 
solved by the political conception ofjustice alone.^^ In such cases, citizens can only sincerely 
vote in accordance with their own comprehensive doctrines because no political conception 
f 
ofjustice can help in the deeply controversial questions. If this is really the case, why should 
one accept the result of voting as reasonable if the majority's view is incompatible with the 
comprehensive doctrines they hold? 
Second, should one accept the voting as a suitable method to solve the problem if he 
sincere believes that his view is right? If one believes that abortion is evil, why should he 
tolerate it even though the result of the voting tells him that the majority accepts it?^° Does 
one really have a moral responsibility in accepting the majority's view? Indeed, I doubt that 
49 Whether abortion is permissible is one of the most controversial political questions in the United States. In 
fact, in order to solve this problem reasonably, comprehensive doctrines appears to be unavoidable. As Galston 
tells us, when we consider abortion, fundamental disagreement usually occurs on whether a fetus should be 
counted as a moral person. This always is a philosophical question. Therefore, when deciding whether abortion 
is permissible, "the state must incline toward one or the other metaphysical view" (Please refer to William 
Galston, "Pluralism and Social Unity", in Ethics, vol. 99 (July, 1989)，p. 721). Ifthis is true, Rawls' political 
conception ofjustice (as well as other political conception of justice) seems to provide no reasonable way for 
the citizens to solve the problem. This is why Rawls only advocates voting as the method (practical) in settling 
such difficult issues. Nevertheless, this will lead to other problems. 
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the idea of voting involves some kind of comprehensive conviction of liberalism. If this is 
true, one will not abide by the result ifhis doctrine does not have this liberal element. This is 
the casejust because ofthe burdens ofjudgment. 
Finally, there may be the problem of "the tyranny of the majority".^^ In Rawls' well-
ordered society, when severe disagreement occurs on the thomy political questions (like that 
of abortion), it seems there is no guarantee that the minority's view will be respected. This is 
unacceptable. As Mill says: 
There needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; 
against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own 
ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the 
development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in 
harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the 
model of its own. This is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion 
with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against 
encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs as protection 
against political despotism.^ ^ 
As Mill points out, no matter how prevailing the ideas or opinions are (including the 
fundamental ideas in the Rawls' political conception of justice), one should not be coerced 
by others into accepting them. Thus, even ifthe result of the voting tells one that the majority 
in a democratic society accepts abortion as permissible, he can and should still refuse to 
accept it i fhe sincerely believes that it is morally wrong. The majority seem to have no right 
to coerce him into tolerating some things which he regards as evil. 
501 will show later that it may not be reasonable to tolerate. 
51 For the discussion of the tyranny of the majority, please refer to John Staut Mill, On Liberty and other 
writings (Cambridge University Press, 1989)，chapter 1. 
52 Jbid, pp. 8-9. 
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In one word, the problem remains unsolved. That is, in a modem democratic society, 
we do not know how to resolve disagreements in a right way because the method given by 
Rawls is unacceptable. It may at best be a practical method. As Dworkin points out: 
This picture of a contest and ultimate victory is drawn with consensual promise in 
mind; it is offered as an account of how society would decide between two 
conceptions of roughly equal antecedent consensual promise. It has nothing to do with 
categorical force, however, it offers no advice to a senator or citizen forced to choose 
between competitive conceptions that fit rhetoric and tradition roughly equally well.^ ^ 
This tells us that if the citizens adopt voting as a method to solve great disagreements, 
it may at best be a compromise. They abide by the result of the voting just because they have 
no other choice (suppose they do not want to appeal to violence). It is practical but may not 
be moral. They accept it not because their public reason tells them to do so (when they are 
holding different comprehensive doctrines which are conflicting with the political conception 
ofjustice). Instead, they must accept it on practical considerations because they do not know 
how to settle thomy political questions in a right way. It is a mere compromise indeed. 
To sum up, it is unclear why the citizens should endorse Rawls' political conception 
ofjustice instead of others. It is also difficult to find a reasonable way to settle controversial 
political questions. The fact is, no prevailing ideas in a democratic society (including the 
fundamental ideas inside Rawls' political conception of justice) can force the citizens to 
accept simply by the popularity alone. That one accepts Rawls' political conception ofjustice 
may be just because one contingently believes its fundamental ideas are the most reasonable 
ones. However, if this is true, whether one accepts it is quite arbitrary and this in tum 
undermines the reasonableness of his political conception of justice (or other political 
conceptions) very much. 
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3. Why can the citizens endorse the political conception of justice? 
I have shown that Rawls is not convincing in arguing for the reasonableness in 
accepting his political conception of justice. In this part, I will try to show further this point: 
it is not true that all reasonable citizens can affirm such a political conception. 
I believe so because of several reasons. First of all, if we accept the burdens of 
judgment as the suitable explanation ofthe reasonable pluralism, I cannot see why we would 
be convinced to believe that all reasonable citizens can affirm the conception of justice even 
though it is political. Secondly, I believe that Rawls' political conception of justice involves 
comprehensive liberal elements. Thus, if Rawls is correct in asserting the effect of the 
burdens of judgment, then, just like any other comprehensive doctrines, the citizens cannot 
endorse his political conception ofjustice unanimously. 
Finally, owing to three reasons, I think that one is unable to respect the political 
virtues in the way described by Rawls. Firstly, I believe that an internal inconsistency needs 
to be solved if Rawls insists that the citizens must respect the political virtues in the political 
aspect. Secondly, it is impossible for one to affirm the priority of right in the political aspect 
regardless of what conception of good one holds. The third reason is that Rawls' demand 
may only lead to the result of schizophrenia. 
Furthermore, I will concentrate on one of the political virtues, namely, the virtue of 
toleration. I want to show that it may not be reasonable or even possible to tolerate other 
comprehensive doctrines which one does not agree with. If I am correct, it is extremely 
doubtful whether the overlapping consensus is realizable because its focus, the political 
conception ofjustice, requires the citizens to tolerate other doctrines which they may regard 
53 Foundations of Liberal Equality , p. 33, italics added. 
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as intolerable. Indeed, I think that large-scale toleration can only be a compromise in 
disguise. 
A. Why can't the burdens ofjudgment cause the disagreement on 
the political conception ofjustice? 
I believe that if the burdens of judgment are the appropriate explanations for the 
inevitability of the reasonable pluralism, the citizens in a democratic society cannot affirm 
any political conception ofjustice unanimously. 
To begin with, we should bear in mind that even if the burdens ofjudgment exist, one 
can still agree on the existence of some obvious features like those of reasonable pluralism. 
One should acknowledge the existence of the burdens of judgment as well because they can 
be easily observed. They explain why we cannot always gain unanimous agreements on 
different events in our daily life. These burdens also explain why it is impossible for all 
citizens in the free institutions of a democratic society to affirm one comprehensive doctrine 
unanimously. 
However, a question arises here. If we agree that these burdens are the suitable 
explanations for the impossibility of the common affirmation on one comprehensive doctrine, 
why is it possible that the citizens can affirm unanimously a conception of justice even 
though it is political?54 
As I have said before, Rawls thinks that the citizens can commonly affirm the 
political conception of justice because it is freestanding and its fundamental ideas are 
54 The need of a commonly accepted conception ofjustice is due to the incommensurability of different 
comprehensive doctrines. But the problem is, that we need it does not imply there is such a political conception 
ofjustice in this world. This is just like the case that we need a legal system which puts no innocent person in 
jail. But it appears that it is impossible to have such a legal system. Similarly, I believe that although we need a 
commonly accepted political conception of justice, we carmot fmd out such a conception because the burdens of 
judgment render any common affirmation impossible. I will discuss this in what follows. 
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prevailing in a democratic society. But the crucial question is, is there any difference between 
the effect of the burdens of judgment on the comprehensive doctrine and that on the 
prevailing ideas? Why do these burdens lead to the impossibility of the common affirmation 
on one comprehensive doctrine but not on the prevailing ideas? 
Let us take a closer look at one of the burdens which I have mentioned in (I) (please 
refer to p. 6), that is, the final burden given by Rawls: great difficulties in setting priorities 
and making adjustments in being forced to select among cherished values. 
Actually, this burden is somehow unclear. If the difficulties mean that we cannot set 
priority or make adjustments when selecting values, there may be no disagreement at all 
because no selection can be made. However, if this burden is used to explain why there is 
disagreement, we should understand it in this way: because it is difficult to set priority and 
make adjustments, at last, some may choose this set of value while some may choose others 
based on their subjective preference. The difficulties render the common selection impossible. 
If this interpretation is plausible, this burden can partly explain why there is no 
comprehensive doctrine chosen by all in a democratic society. 
However, why doesn't this burden have the same effect on the prevailing ideas in a 
democratic society? Does Rawls say that the term 'values' in this burden refers only to 
“values of comprehensive doctrine" but not "values of the fundamental ideas"? 
Even i fhe really says so, it appears that he is quite unreasonable to make such a claim. 
The burdens of judgment explain why disagreement is natural and unavoidable. But the 
disagreement caused by these burdens should not be limited to the comprehensive doctrine 
only. From the description of these burdens given by Rawls, they explain most of the 
disagreements in our daily life. Among these disagreements, those which involve value 
judgment may be the paradigm cases. 
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Thus, if the burdens of judgment can explain why the citizens cannot commonly 
affirm any comprehensive doctrine, they also render the common affirmation on the 
prevailing ideas impossible. This is because these ideas involve moral values. It is too 
optimistic to think that all citizens can affirm them whatever comprehensive doctrine they 
hold. Indeed, if we take a look at the modem democratic society, we may discover that there 
are certainly some who do not accept these ideas. Although these ideas are widely shared, 
they are not shared by all. This may be because some citizens hold a certain kind of 
comprehensive doctrine which is not compatible with these ideas and they choose to hold the 
former instead of the latter. 
For instance, in a democratic society, there are indeed some religions like Islam 
which do not accept the liberal ideas of person and society.^^ People holding these religions 
must choose between the values in their religions and the prevailing liberal ideas when they 
are in conflicts. But it is extremely doubtful that they will choose the latter all the time.^^ 
Suppose citizen A does not accept the fundamental idea of society as fair terms of 
cooperation. He believes that there is a God who creates this world and he creates people 
differently. Some people are created as slaves while some are masters. Because of this, the 
basic structure of a society should be regulated by the principles which can reinforce this 
master-slave relationship. For him, maybe some kinds of slavery system in ancient time is 
much more reasonable than today's democratic society. 
In this case, Rawls (as well as many other citizens) may reply that citizen A is 
unreasonable. But as I demonstrated before, it is circular for him to grant the meaning of the 
'reasonable' at the outset. Besides, even if Rawls can find out some kind of reasons which 
55 e.g. For a Islamite, a man is of course superior to a woman. The former should enjoy privileges in the political 
aspect according to such a believer. It seems that it is hard for him to accept whole-heartedly the liberal ideas of 
person and society provided that he really devotes himself to his religion. 
6 Rawls thinks that the political virtues may normally outweigh the non-political ones. I think that this view is 
problematic and I will discuss it later. Moreover, I believe that since people do not accept the superiority of the 
political virtues, they will not endorse the political conception of justice simply. This is one of the reasons why 
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are not question begging, it seems that citizens A may not accept them because of the 
burdens of judgment. Provided the burdens exist, disagreements are inevitable, especially the 
disagreements on the moral values. Why should one accept these set of moral values but not 
the other? It seems that it is hard to have strong justification on any particular set of moral 
values at all.^^ 
Since the ideas in the political conception of justice are fundamental, whether 
accepting them or not may be quite subjective. Indeed, a conception which is valuable to one 
may be nothing to others. At last, the doctrine one accepts may simply be his own decision. 
CO 
This is what Max Weber calls decisionism and this is a special and unavoidable feature of 
modemity. 
Maybe the best defense for these ideas is to ask the one who does not accept them to 
give reasons for his choice. But this obviously does not work because one may give reasons 
from his own comprehensive doctrine. If this is the case, the situation is the same. That is, no 
one can give arguments which can be accepted by all. As a result, even though the liberal 
ideas of person and society are political rather than comprehensive, it is impossible that 
everyone can accept them. 
One should keep in mind that I am not asserting the impossibility for the citizens to 
discuss the meaning of the term 'reasonable' publicly. I just doubt if there can be a common 
understanding of this term in a pluralistic society. Of course, most of us may think that a 
militant Islam is unreasonable. But I doubt if they will accept that they are unreasonable even 
the overlapping consensus is not realistic in a pluralistic society. 
571 believe Kai Nielsen's essay "Why should I be moral?" in Kai Nielsen, Why Be Moral? (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 1989) is one of the most outstanding representatives on this issue. 
58 "According to our ultimate standpoint, the one is the devil and the other the God, and the individual has to 
decide which is God for him and which is the devil. And so it goes throughout all the orders of life." From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), translated by H. H. Gerth and C. 
WrightMills, p. 148. 
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after a free and equal contest with us (though there may be some of them who can be 
convinced by us).^^ 
Moreover, apart from these extreme religions, there are still other comprehensive 
doctrines which do not hold the liberal ideas of person and society. Provided that the burdens 
ofjudgment exist, I doubt as well if they will accept these ideas. If this is really the case, it is 
hopeless that all citizens will affirm the political conception of justice as well as its 
fundamental ideas. In the last resort, Rawls will simply exclude them from a well-ordered 
society because they are politically unreasonable. As he says, “[o]f course, fundamentalist 
religious doctrines and autocratic and dictatorial rulers will reject the ideas of public reason 
and deliberative democracy. They will say that democracy leads to a culture contrary to their 
religion, or denies the values that only autocratic or dictatorial rule can secure. They assert 
that the religiously true, or the philosophically true, overrides the politically reasonable. We 
simply say that such a doctrine is politically unreasonable. Within political liberalism 
nothing more need be said.”^� 
But as I have said, if he does so, then the remaining ones in a well-ordered society 
may only be those who can accept the liberal ideas just like the three views in his example of 
the overlapping consensus. If this is so, what is the significance of PL7 Even ATOJ can 
accomplish this. There is no need for him to seek the public justification because the 
overlapping consensus only needs to contain those ‘reasonable，doctrines. It seems redundant 
for him to transform his conception of justice from a comprehensive doctrine to a political 
conception because even though the conception of justice is comprehensive, those 
'reasonable' comprehensive doctrines can affirm it at well.^^ 
59 This involves the problems ofrelativism which I cannot afford to discuss in this thesis. 
6° John Rawls, "The Idea ofPublic Reason Revisited", in The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 64, 
(Summer 1997, Number 3), pp. 805-806, italics added. 
61 Moreover, as I have shown, Rawls is circular in arguing for the political reasonableness ofhis conception of 
justice. 
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Thus, owing to the burdens of judgment, I would like to conclude that it is not 
convincing for Rawls to claim that the citizens can commonly affirm the political conception 
ofjustice if they cannot affirm any comprehensive doctrine unanimously. 
In this part, I use the burdens of judgment to reject that the political conception of 
justice can be the focus of the overlapping consensus. However, this may lead to objection. 
62 
In fact, the way I use the burdens of judgment is too strong according to some people (I 
argue that these burdens lead to the result that we cannot even agree on the political 
conception ofjustice). Some think that this is a wrong criticism. As Muhall and Swift say, 
These two lines of criticism of his ‘burdens of judgment' go wrong because they 
assume that reasonable constraints are purely epistemological rather than being 
crucially moral in nature. The burdens of judgment are indeed purely epistemological 
phenomena, but it is only when conjoined with certain moral assumptions that they 
deliver his full account of the reasonable; and his views, first, that there cannot be 
reasonable disagreement over the political values and, second, that there cannot be 
reasonable agreement upon (elements of) comprehensive doctrines, will remain 
incomprehensible if they are taken independently of those moral assumptions. If, 
however, we see that it is part of what it means to be reasonable that one views society 
as a system of fair cooperation between free and equal citizens, then it follows 
immediately that it is (morally) unreasonable to violate the general priority of political 
over non-political values^ ^ 
Muhall and Swift tell us that only when the burdens of judgment conjoined with the 
moral ideas of person and society will they lead to the result that "it is unreasonable to 
violate the general priority of political over non-political values". They render the moral 
requirement of toleration plausible. This is the real fiinction of the burdens. 
Although I agree with them that the burdens of judgment must conjoin with the moral 
ideas in order to perform their real function, I think they are wrong to claim that the criticism 
62 Liberals & Communitarians, p. 234. 
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goes wrong. This is because even if I accept the role of the burdens of judgment are not 
"purely epistemological" but "being crucially moral in nature", the problems still exist. That 
is，they inevitably lead to disagreements. 
Because of the burdens of judgment, it is natural for the citizens to disagree on the 
liberal ideas or the meaning ofthe term 'reasonable'. This undermines the persuasive power 
of Rawls' theory. No matter what the real function of the burdens ofjudgment is, we should 
clarify the nature and the effect of them. But once I take them into examination, I discover 
that they create serious problems for PL. 
B. Is political conception ofjustice really political? 
a. The affirmation of the burdens ofjudgment 
As I have argued above, it is quite impossible that all reasonable citizens can affirm 
Rawls' political conception of justice because of the burdens of judgment. In this part, I 
would like to show that citizens cannot affirm it because it is not as freestanding as Rawls 
claims it to be. In other words, I believe Rawls' political conception of justice involves 
comprehensive element implicitly. Some people like Muhall and Swift, think so: 
Indeed, since mounting even this defense implies - on Rawls' own admission 一 
denying the truth of any comprehensive convictions that contest the reality or 
significance of the fact of reasonable pluralism, it appears that how we acknowledge 
the burdens ofjudgment is in fact a function of our comprehensive convictions.^ ^ 
They think that the way we acknowledge the burdens of judgment involves our 
comprehensive convictions and thus, the assertion of the burdens is not purely political 
”ibid. , pp. 237. 
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(Here, the meaning of the acknowledgement of the burdens is the acknowledgment of their 
result, that is, the reasonableness of toleration). 
According to Rawls, the burdens of judgment lead to the virtue of toleration. 
However, in order to make this sound, the burdens must be conjoined with the liberal ideas of 
person and society. This is because if persons are not equal and free or the society is not a 
fair system of cooperation, the stronger ones may not accept that it is reasonable to tolerate 
the weaker ones. Thus, if we acknowledge the burdens of judgment as the reason of our 
toleration, we must at first accept the liberal ideas of person and society. 
Nonetheless, as I demonstrated above, the liberal ideas of person and society may not 
be justified to all citizens indeed. For those who accept these ideas, their acceptance may 
usually involve their own comprehensive doctrine. This is why Mulhall and Swift say that “it 
appears that how we acknowledge the burdens of judgment is in fact a function of our 
comprehensive convictions" and they claim that: 
In that case, Rawls' latest defense of the limits of the political itself fails to respect 
those limits; the purely political Rawlsian state must inevitably base itself upon 
elements of a comprehensive doctrine, and so fails to live up to its own claims to 
neutrality.65 
However, I think that their argument is inadequate. This is because they just argue 
that people affirm the political conception of justice due to their own comprehensive 
doctrine, but they do not show us that the political conception of justice is not freestanding. 
Indeed, we should clarify two questions at first. The first question is whether the 
citizens affirm the political conception of justice because of their own comprehensive 
doctrine. Even if the answer to this question is yes, it does not mean that Rawls' political 
64 ibid., p. 245. 
65 ibid., p. 245. 
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conception ofjustice is not freestanding. Rawls himself explicitly claims that the citizens can 
freely think that the political conception of justice is derived from their own comprehensive 
doctrine (please refer to (I)). 
The second question is whether the political conception of justice can be presented as 
independent of any comprehensive doctrine. The answer to this question is the key point of 
Rawls' political conception of justice as freestanding. If the political conception of justice 
cannot be presented as independent of any comprehensive doctrine, it is not a freestanding 
conception and Rawls' work in PL is a total failure. 
This is why I believe that Rawls will reply Muhall and Swift as follow: whether one 
accepts the political conception of justice of course can depend on his own comprehensive 
doctrine. However, this does not mean that the political conception itself involves 
comprehensive elements. Once the political conception of justice can be presented as 
freestanding, it involves no comprehensive element at all. Thus, Muhall and Swift do not 
show successfully that Rawls' political conception ofjustice is comprehensive. 
Owing to this, when one wants to show that Rawls' political conception of justice is 
not political, one cannot show only that people endorse it because of their comprehensive 
doctrine (this is neither necessary nor sufficient). Instead, one must show that the 
fundamental ideas in his political conception of justice contain comprehensive convictions. 
This is what I am going to do. I want to show in the following section that the liberal idea of 
person is not so freestanding as Rawls supposes it to be. 
b. The fundamental liberal idea ofperson 
Rawls believes that the political conception of justice articulates the prevailing ideas 
and is built upon them so that it can be publicly justified. But the problem is, where do these 
49 
Whv not Political Liberalism Bv Ting-Yat Chui 
ideas come from? Do they appear independently of any comprehensive doctrine? This is 
obviously not the case. Although these ideas are embedded in the political culture in a 
modem democratic society, they originated from the doctrine of liberalism. To say that they 
are political instead of comprehensive seems to be somehow self-cheating. 
For instance, is person really free and equal? As I have said several times, there are 
comprehensive religious doctrines which are incompatible with or do not accept this liberal 
idea of person. This, to a certain extent, shows us that the liberal ideas may not be as 
freestanding as Rawls claims. Nonetheless, Rawls does admit that whether one accepts these 
ideas may depend on his own comprehensive doctrine. That some comprehensive doctrines 
do not contain them does not imply the political conception ofjustice is not freestanding. The 
most important question is whether the political conception of justice itself can be presented 
as a freestanding conception. 
In fact, I think that Rawls' presentation of the political conception of justice as 
freestanding is not convincing, since its fundamental idea of person involves comprehensive 
liberal elements. Let us examine it closely. 
In PL, Rawls says that the conception of person is political. "[P]ersons were regarded 
as free and equal persons in virtue of their possessing to the requisite degree the two powers 
of moral personality, namely, the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a 
conception ofthe good" {PL, p. 34). 
Person are free and equal because they possess the two moral powers. In fact, they are 
free in three aspects: 
• They are free because they think that they have moral power to have, revise, and 
change their conception of good. 
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• They regard themselves as self-authenticating sources of valid claims which are 
different from a slave. 
• They regard themselves as capable oftaking responsibility for their ends， 
I believe the political conception of person is indeed a reply to the critique of Michael 
Sandel's, Liberalism and the Limit of Justice. His book points out that there is a metaphysical 
conception of person in Rawls' original position. In order to avoid this charge, Rawls 
emphasizes that the conception of person is political in nature. Moreover, he tries to reply 
this criticism in a footnote: 
Part of the difficulty (difficulty in showing that the view of metaphysical 
presupposition in the original position has no foothold) is that there is no accepted 
understanding of what a metaphysical doctrines is... One might also say that our 
ordinary conception of persons as the basic units of deliberation and responsibility 
presupposes, or in some way involves, certain metaphysical theses about the nature of 
persons as moral or political agents. Following the precept of avoidance, I should not 
want to deny these claims...If metaphysical presuppositions are involved, perhaps 
they are so general that they would not distinguish between the metaphysical views.. • 
In this case they would not appear to be relevant for the structure and content of a 
political conception of justice one way or the other. {PL, p. 29, f.n. 31, parenthesis 
added) 
This shows us that Rawls does not ignore Sandel's challenge on the metaphysical 
conception of person in the original position. However, does Rawls successfully reply to 
Sandel's criticism? Are the metaphysical presuppositions in the original position (if any) 
really “so general that they would not distinguish between the metaphysical views"? I am 
afraid that he is too optimistic in claiming this. Let us take a brief consideration on why 
66 PL, pp. 29-34. 
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Sandel claims that there is a metaphysical conception of person in Rawls，original position at 
first. 
First of all, Sandel tells us that the metaphysical conception of person in Rawls' 
original position is common to deontological liberalism in general. As he points out, Rawls， 
liberalism is deontological in nature which is similar to Kant's: 
Like Kant, Rawls is a deontological liberal. His book takes the main thesis of the 
deontological ethic as its central claim...It concerns not the principles of justice but 
the status of justice itself. It is the assertion that both opens the book and concludes it, 
the core conviction Rawls seeks above all to defend. It is the claim that ‘justice is the 
first virtue of social institutions,, the single most important consideration in assessing 
the basic structure of society and the overall direction of social change? 
In fact, "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions" (the priority of right over 
good) is the core conviction in Rawls' theory both in ATOJ or PL. He puts this deep 
conviction at the beginning of ATOJ 'm this way: 
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A 
theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; 
likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be 
reformed or abolished ifthey are unjust. (ATOJ, p. 3) 
One can feel how important this idea is in Rawls' theory from this short paragraph. In 
order to make a society just, Rawls must find out the suitable principles of justice which can 
be used to regulate a society. He uses the original position to simulate the circumstances of 
67 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice (Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 15, italics 
added. In this passage, the term ‘book’ refers to y4rOJinstead of PL. 
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justice68 and he thinks that the principles of justice chosen by the parties inside are those 
which should be adopted by everyone because of the nature of the original position: 
I have emphasized that this original position is purely hypothetical. It is natural to ask 
why, if this agreement is never actually entered into, we should take any interest in 
these principles, moral or otherwise. The answer is that the conditions embodied in the 
description of the original position are ones that we do in fact accept. Or if we do not, 
then perhaps we can be persuaded to do so by philosophical reflection. Each aspect of 
the contractual situation can be given supporting grounds...One way to look at the 
idea of the original position, therefore, is to see it as an expository device which sums 
up the meaning of these conditions and helps us to extract their consequences. On the 
other hand, this conception is also an intuitive notion that suggests its own elaboration, 
so that led on by it we are drawn to define more clearly the standpoint from which we 
can best interpret moral relationships. {ATOJ, pp. 21-22)^ ^ 
A similar view can also be found in PL\ 
As a device of representation the idea of the original position serves as a means of 
public reflection and self-clarification. It helps us work out what we now think, once 
we are able to take a clear and uncluttered view of whatjustice requires when society 
is conceived as a scheme of cooperation between free and equal citizens from one 
generation to the next. The original position serves as a mediating idea by which all 
our considered convictions, whatever their level of generality...can be brought to bear 
on one another. This enables us to establish greater coherence among all ourjudgment; 
and with this deeper self-understanding we can attain wider agreement among one 
another. (PL, p. 26) 
bs The circumstances of justice are the conditions that cause the problem ofjust ice to arise {A TOJ, 126-130). 
Among them, the condition of moderate scarcity and that of mutual disinterestedness are the most important 
ones. As Rawls says, “For simplicity I often stress the condition of moderate scarcity (among the objective 
circumstances), and that ofmutual disinterest or individuals taking no interest in one another's interest (among 
the subjective circumstances)...Unless these circumstances existed there would be no occasion for the virtue of 
justice，jiist as in the absence of threats of injury to life and limb there would be no occasion for physical 
courage." {A TOJ, p. 128) From this, one can easily see that if there are no circumstances ofjustice in a society, 
the persons inside have no need to treatjustice as a virtue. 
69 Please refer to Ronald Dworkin, "The Original Position" in Reading Rawls (Stanford; California: Stanford 
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These two passages display the idea of the original position in both of ATOJ and PL. 
It is a device which can help us to “best interpret moral relationships". These relationships 
are in a scheme of fair cooperation between persons who are free and equal in a modem 
democratic society because “the conditions embodied in the description of the original 
position are ones that we do in fact accept". And these conditions constitute the 
circumstances of justice. 
Rawls thinks that for a society which is situated in these circumstances, justice will be 
the first virtue. However, as Sandel says, this assertion of "justice as the first virtue" in fact 
presupposes a metaphysical conception of the self which deontological liberalism always 
contains: 
With each transition, a substantive self, thick with particular traits, is progressively 
shom of characteristics once taken to be essential to its identity; as more of its features 
are seen to be arbitrarily given, they are relegated from presumed constituents to mere 
attributes of the self. More becomes mine, and less remains me, to recall our earlier 
formulation, until ultimately the self is purged of empirical constituents altogether, and 
transformed into a condition of agency standing beyond the objects of its 
possession.. .Only if the fate ofthe self is thus detached from of its attributes and aims, 
subject as they are to the vagaries of circumstances, can its priority be preserved and 
its agency guaranteed/� 
Sandel claims this because for a deontological liberal like Rawls, the main theme of 
his doctrine is "priority ofright over good". This means that whatever the conception ofgood 
one is holding, whenever this conception is in conflict with right (the principles ofjustice), it 
must be abandoned or reformulated. 
Briefly speaking, the plausibility of the above theme presupposes "priority ofthe self 
over its ends". This is needed because the "priority of right over good" presupposes that one 
University Press, 1974), ed. Norman Daniels for a detailed discussion ofthe original position inATOJ. 
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is able to revise or abandon his goals, desires, or conception of good whenever they come 
into conflict with the principles of justice. This ability implies a self which is prior to its 
ends. It is a self which is able to choose among different goals, ends or conceptions of good 
and is distinct from them. As Sandel claims that: 
The priority of the self over its ends means that I am not merely the passive receptacle 
of the accumulated aims, attributes, and purposes thrown up by experience, not simply 
a product of the vagaries of circumstance, but always, irreducibly, an active, willing 
agent, distinguishable from my surroundings, and capable of choice. To identify any 
set of characteristics as my aims, ambitions, desires, and so on, is always to imply 
some subject ‘me’ standing behind them, and the shape of this ‘me’ must be given 
prior to any of the ends or attributes I bear.. .And before an end can be chosen, there 
must be a self around to choose i t” 
Accordingly, with the purpose of making "priority of right over good" valid, there 
must be a self which is prior to its ends, interests, ambitions and so on. It is an 
"unencumbered self’ which can be detached from its circumstances. And the most important 
point is, it can make choice freely. In fact, it is a “choosing self" which chooses among 
different conceptions of good which are compatible with the two principles ofjustice (recall 
the first property of a free person in which I showed in p. 50). 
If Rawls' conception of person really contains implicitly such an idea of choosing 
self, then it is not simply a political conception. Instead, it is a liberal conception. Apparently, 
this conception may not be contained in other comprehensive doctrines which are not liberal 
in nature. 
7° Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 94. 
71 Jbid, p. 19. 
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If Sandel is right in arguing that the conception of person is an unencumbered self in 
ATOJ, then the political conception ofjustice in PL would also involve this metaphysical 
conception as well. 
In PL, the original position is still adopted to obtain the principles of justice. Thus, if 
the principles ofjustice chosen by the parties in the original position fit such a metaphysical 
conception of person, it is hard to argue that they are freestanding because this metaphysical 
conception may not be so prevailing in a democratic society. 
Surprisingly, Rawls seems to underestimate the effect of this critique. His response is 
simple. Despite its considerable length, I quote the following passage because of its 
importance: 
I believe this to be an illusion caused by not seeing the original position as a device of 
representation. The veil of ignorance, to mention one prominent feature of that 
position, has no specific metaphysical implications concerning the self; it does not 
imply that the self is ontologically prior to the facts about persons that the parties are 
excluded from knowing. We can, as it were, enter this position at any time simply by 
reasoning for principles of justice in accordance with the enumerated restrictions on 
information. When, in this way, we simulate being in the original position, our 
reasoning no more commits us to a particular metaphysical doctrine about the nature 
of the self than our acting a part in a play, say of Macbeth or lady Macbeth, commits 
us to thinking that we are really a king or a queen engaged in a desperate struggle for 
political power. We must keep in mind that we are trying to show how the idea of 
society as a fair system of social cooperation can be unfolded so as to find principles 
specifying the basic rights and liberties and the forms of equality most appropriate to 
those cooperating, once they are regarded as citizens, as free and equal persons. {PL, 
P. 27)72 
72 Rawls says, "I believe the reply found in chap. 4 ofWill Kymlicka's Liberalism, Community, and Culture 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) is on the whole satisfactory, modulo adjustments that may need to be made to 
fit it within political liberalism as opposed to liberalism as a comprehensive doctrine" {PL, p. 27, f.n. 29). 
Nevertheless, in chap. 4 of Liberalism, Community, and Culture, The work ofKymlicka's is mainly to criticize 
Sandel's communitarian's conception of selfinstead of showing that Rawls' theory does not contain a 
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Rawls' reply is simple and in a sense superficial: Sandel is wrong in not seeing the 
original position as a device of representation. In fact, the original position is just similar to a 
role play. We act as one of the characters but we certainly know that we are not them. We 
just try to "show how the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation can be 
unfolded so as to find principles specifying the basic rights and liberties and the forms of 
equality most appropriate to those cooperating, once they are regarded as citizens, as free and 
equal persons" in the original position. 
To tell the truth, I find this reply puzzling and I really doubt ifthis can be a good reply 
to Sandel's criticism. First of all, Rawls does not explicitly claim that the original position 
contains no metaphysical conception of person at all. He just says that, “our reasoning no 
more commits us to a particular metaphysical doctrine about the nature of the self than our 
acting a part in a play". 
However, do the characters in the play have that metaphysical nature of the self? 
Although Rawls seems to deny the metaphysical conception of person in the original position 
(as I have quoted his words earlier, he thinks that even if the original position really involves 
a metaphysical conception of person, it is general enough and would not distinguish between 
different metaphysical views), he has offered no detailed argument. But this is obviously not 
enough because Sandel has explicitly shown that Rawls' original position contains such a 
metaphysical conception of person. In order to reply him, Rawls must at least tell us why the 
metaphysical self pointed out by Sandel is not necessarily contained in the original position. 
It seems to me that Rawls simply avoid the question and this is why I think that his work is 
far from satisfactory. 
On the other hand, if the original position really contains such a metaphysical 
conception of self, the problem is serious. In fact, if we simply treat the original position as a 
metaphysical conception of self. Thus, whether his reply can stand or not is not the concem ofthat chapter. 
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role play, it is unclear why we should abide by the principles chosen in it after the veil of 
ignorance is lifted up. Although we may have good reasons to adopt them, this does not mean 
that they have a categorical force on us. 
This is especially true if we just treat the original position as a device of 
representation. When we are Macbeth in a drama, we act according to his personality. 
However, we need not live like him (though we may think that we are willing to be him) in 
our daily life. 
The original position differs from a drama in that the former has some properties 
similar to our real situations. They are the circumstances of justice. And thus, the principles 
of justice chosen in it should be adopted by us if they can pass the test of reflective 
equilibrium. It has effect on our real life and this is why we cannot merely treat the original 
position as a role play. 
Hence, if Rawls insists that we should abide by the principles chosen in the original 
position (no matter in the political aspect or non-political ones), he must admit that to a 
certain extent, the nature of person in his mind is similar to that of the member inside the 
original position. This admission shows us that his idea of person must involve a 
metaphysical conception of person if the original position really contains such a conception 
indeed. 
In a nutshell, I would like to conclude that even though the function of the original 
position is simply a device of representation, once it involves a liberal metaphysical 
conception of person, whether Rawls' political conception of justice is freestanding will be 
highly doubtful. Besides, if Rawls denies the metaphysical conception of person in the 
original position pointed out by Sandel without showing the reasons in detail, his work is far 
from enough. 
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C. Political virtue? 
a. The reasons for the stableness of a well-ordered society 
As I have mentioned in (I), in a well-ordered society, stability is sustained because of 
two reasons. One is what Rawls calls moral psychology while the other is the reasonable 
overlapping consensus. 
I will not take up the former in this thesis. For the latter, it can sustain stability 
because when it is realized, the citizens can hold their own comprehensive doctrines on the 
one hand and the political conception ofjustice on the other. When settling basic political 
questions, they are willing to abide by the political conception of justice which is the content 
of the public reason, instead oftheir own comprehensive doctrines. 
Even if there are conflicts between the political conception of justice and different 
comprehensive doctrines, the stability will not be undermined. This is due to the reason that 
the political virtues (which sustain the political conception ofjustice) may normally outweigh 
77 
the non-political values. Recall the important passage I have quoted in (I) Q3. 19). It tells us 
why a well-ordered society is stable: 
• The virtues ofpolitical cooperation that make a constitutional regime possible are 
very great (e.g. virtue of toleration, reasonableness). The values conflict with the 
political conception of justice and its sustaining political virtues may be normally 
outweighed because they come into conflict with the very conditions that make 
fair social cooperation possible. 
73 This is one of the reasons why Rawls thinks that the overlapping consensus is possible and it is also the key 
point ofwhy the well-ordered society is stable in a right way. 
59 
Whv not Political Liberalism Bv Ting-Yat Chui 
• Severe conflicts are much reduced as the political conception of justice is not 
viewed as incompatible with basic religious, philosophical, and moral values 
when reasonable overlapping consensus is realized. 
Nonetheless, these two points are obscure and the vagueness inside hinders our 
understanding of what Rawls exactly means. 
First of all, if the political conception of justice is really compatible with the basic 
comprehensive doctrines in a democratic society, why are there severe conflicts? If the severe 
conflicts are much reduced, then why should Rawls take the problem of stability so 
seriously? What is the exact meaning of ‘are much reduced'? Does it refer to “no conflict at 
all"? If this is so, Rawls need not raise the first point because there is no conflict needed to be 
resolved by the superiority of the political virtues. If not, how serious are the conflicts? Are 
they severe enough to undermine the social unity of a well-ordered society? 
In fact, obviously, the political conception of justice may be in conflict with some 
religious doctrines like Islam and we can predict the conflicts may be quite severe. If they are 
severe enough, how can the political virtues normally outweigh the non-political ones? Is it 
enough to claim only that because these political virtues are great, thus, they can have the 
outweighing power in case of conflict? 
Moreover, one can also find that “may be normally outweighed" in Rawls' first point 
is especially indistinct. That the non-political values may be normally outweighed by the 
political ones means that it also may not be the case. If the non-political values can really 
outweigh the political virtues, when will be the case and why is it so? Rawls just explains 
why the non-political values are normally outweighed, but not why this may not be the case. 
If it really happens, will the stability of a well-ordered society be shaken? 
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All these lead to confusion. It is quite astonishing that Rawls just puts these questions 
aside. Maybe we should not treat the passage so strictly since it is only some kind of 
estimation. There is no well-ordered society in human history at all. He may not have deeply 
thought about the situation of a well-ordered society indeed7^ 
If this is really the case, I think it is time for us to make it clear and to reflect whether 
his view is reasonable. In fact, I believe that Rawls is unsuccessful in his argument for the 
superiority of the political virtues. Because of this, I do not find the possibility of the 
overlapping consensus or its stability convincing. 
b. It is impossible for all reasonable citizens to respect political virtues in the 
political aspect 
i. The aim of social cooperation 
I believe that Rawls fails to argue for the superiority of the political virtues because of 
several reasons. First of all, there is an internal inconsistency he needs to solve if he insists 
his point. 
Rawls thinks that the political virtues may normally outweigh other conflicting non-
political values because they are "the very conditions that make fair social cooperation 
possible on a footing of mutual respect". Nevertheless, in order that this reason can 
successfully support the superiority of the political virtues, Rawls needs to show further why 
the fair social cooperation is so important that the citizens can suppress their own 
comprehensive doctrines for them in case of conflict. 
74 This may be quite similar to Marx's prediction ofthe utopia. That is, in such a place, people can do what they 
want in most of the time and because ofthe highly developed productive forces, they only need to spend very 
little time in producing. For an excellent exposition ofMarx's historical materialism, please refer to Cohen, G. 
A., Karl Marx 's Theory of History: A Defence, (Oxford and Princeton, 1978). 
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Simply speaking, for a liberal like Rawls, the fair social cooperation is important 
because it provides a set of institutions in which one can freely pursue his own conception of 
good. Man's power is limited, so, if one wants to fulfill his goals, he may have to ask for the 
cooperation of others. This is why we need a society. In a society, we can achieve our goals 
much easier through cooperation. If the society is unfair, some may be repressed by others 
and their conceptions of good cannot be pursued. This is not an acceptable society for a 
liberal. 
However, there is obviously a presupposition in this liberal idea. That is, for a liberal, 
onejoins the society in order to pursue his own conception of good. Thus, joining society can 
be said to be a means while the pursuing of one's conception of good is the end. 
If this is true, when one finds that the society he joins cannot help him to realize his 
conception of good, or more extremely, even limits him to achieve his goal, should he still 
abide by the rules in that society provided that he cannot leave it? Is this really reasonable? 
For instance, suppose there is a devout religious believer whose conception of good is 
to make others believe in his religious comprehensive doctrine and he does not accept that 
people are equal and free (because of his own comprehensive doctrine). Furthermore, his 
doctrine tells him that there is nothing wrong in coercing others into believing his doctrine. In 
fact, his ultimate goal is to establish a society which is ruled by his doctrine. 
In this case, the man's convictions obviously conflict with the political virtues like the 
virtue of toleration. Why can the political virtues outweigh his comprehensive convictions? 
That they make the fair social cooperation possible does not guarantee the man will accept 
them instead of the non-political values. 
Indeed, if the aim of joining a society is to advance mutual benefits (remember the 
mutually-disinterested person in the original position), it is unclear why the virtues which 
sustain such a fair society are so important to the one who cannot benefit from that society. It 
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is also unclear why the man in the example can suppress his own comprehensive doctrine for 
the political conception ofjustice. 
Here, Rawls will of course reply in this way: one should respect other's freedom to 
realize their conceptions of good because people are all equal and free. Thus, if the pursuing 
of one's conception of good needs to sacrifice those of the others, one should not pursue it. 
This is the virtue of reasonableness. 
However, this view is questionable. It is true that Rawls does not base the principles 
of justice on a self-interested person solely (both in ATOJor PL) because he knows very well 
that such a person may not abide by the principles if the veil of ignorance is lifted up. As 
Bernard Williams says, 
Rawls did not suppose that social justice could be based solely on self-interest.. .The 
whole point of the model is that a person who is willing to think in these terms, to 
imagine himself prepared to consider what is fair, he is a person who, as well as being 
merely rational, is 'reasonable', as Rawls says, and is willing to live on reasonable 
terms of cooperation with others. This point, central to Theory, was made entirely 
clear there, and Rawls has shown a saintly degree of patience with the remarkable 
number of critics who have not understood it/^ 
Unfortunately, as I have shown, it is untrue that all the citizens in a democratic 
society are 'reasonable' in Rawls' sense. And the fatal point is, he is circular and thus, 
unconvincing, in arguing for the 'reasonableness' of the fundamental liberal ideas of person 
and society in the political conception ofjustice. 
It appears that the problem still remains unsolved: provided that one believes Rawls' 
use of the term 'reasonableness' is not really reasonable, why should one abide by the 
principles ofjustice after the veil ofignorance is removed? 
75 Bernard Williams, "A Fair State", p. 7. 
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Besides, even if the man endorses the reasonableness in accepting these fundamental 
ideas as well as his political conception of justice, this does not mean that he will accept the 
superiority of the political virtues too. As I have said, if Rawls wants to base the superiority 
of the political virtues on their function as the very conditions which make the fair social 
cooperation possible, he must show us why the citizens can suppress their comprehensive 
doctrines for it in case of conflict. And bear in mind that we are now discussing whether the 
man who has a conception of good which is conflicting with the political virtues will choose 
the latter instead of the former. But the point is that even if the man has already accepted the 
liberal ideas, this does not imply that the political virtues will win all the time. This is because 
though he endorses the liberal ideas, he may also think that it is reasonable to abide by his 
comprehensive convictions. 
Actually, while one can hold that he should establish a society which is regulated by 
his comprehensive doctrine (even though this may involve coercion). He may also think that 
it is reasonable not to invade others' rights because people are equal and free，However, 
neither does Rawls guarantee that the political virtues will outweigh the non-political ones, 
nor does he successfully show that the former may normally outweigh the latter. 
In short, if Rawls wants to base the stability of a well-ordered society on the political 
virtues, it is inadequate for him to show only the reasonableness in accepting the political 
conception of justice. He must also display the reasonableness of the superiority of the 
political virtue ^>rovided that one's aim ofjoining the society is to pursue his own conception 
of good) in a convincing way. Regrettably, he just simply claims that they are “the very 
76 Some may think that it is impossible for one to hold two incompatible ideas at the same time. But this is 
obviously wrong. We usually face such predicaments in our daily life. Otherwise, inconsistency of our responses 
to certain event become impossible. As Alasdair MacIntyre says, "To some significant, even if unmeasured 
extent, these disagreements seem to occur within individuals, one and the same individual hovering between two 
or more rival opinions, inclining to one on some occasions and in some contexts, to another on others." In 
Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture", in The Liberalism-Communitarianism 
Debate (Rowman & Littlefield, 1994) ed. C.F. Delaney, p_ 7. This 'hovering' puts the possibility of the 
overlapping consensus or even its stability into doubt. 
64 
Whv not Political Liberalism Bv Ting-Yat Chui 
conditions that make fair social cooperation possible on a footing of mutual respect". This is 
apparently unacceptable to a person who is holding a conception of good which is not liberal 
in nature. 
ii. It is impossible to privatize the good 
Apart from what I have discussed above, there is a much more crucial reason for why 
it is impossible for all reasonable citizens to respect the political virtues as well as endorsing 
the political conception of justice in the political aspect. 
As Rawls declares, the political virtues include the "virtues of tolerance and being 
ready to meet others halfway, and the virtue ofreasonableness and the sense of faimess" {PL, 
p. 157). Among them, the virtue ofreasonableness is the key point to why one should accept 
the political conception of justice. However, as I have shown, Rawls fails to argue for the 
reasonableness ofhis use ofthe term ‘reasonable，. Hence, he is not convincing in imposing a 
moral responsibility on the citizens to accept the political conception ofjustice. 
Here, I would like to further suggest that the citizens cannot affirm Rawls' political 
virtues unanimously as well because they require the citizens to endorse the political 
conception of justice in the political aspect no matter what conception of good they hold7^ 
At the very beginning of this chapter (p. 26), I have put Rawls' ambition in this way: 
he wants the citizens in a democratic society, who are holding different comprehensive 
doctrines and conceptions of good, to affirm liberal's priority of right in the political aspect 
and put their non-political values in the bracket when considering political questions7^ 
771 believe this point is also valid in arguing the impossibility in accepting other political virtues. 
78 Here, "the priority ofright means that the principles of political justice impose limits on permissible ways of 
life; and hence the claims citizens make to pursue ends that transgress those limits have no weighf' (PL, p. 174, 
italics added). 
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This ambition is easy to understand. Rawls wants all citizens in a pluralistic 
democratic society to affirm his political conception of justice, that is, to abide by the two 
principles of justice, in the political aspect, whatever conceptions of good they hold. If the 
conception of good one holds is in conflict with the political conception of justice, the former 
will have to give way to the latter. But we can freely pursue our own conceptions of good in 
private life which is not regulated by the political conception of justice (remember, the 
subject to which the political conception ofjustice applies is the basic structure). 
Nonetheless, the question one should ask is, is it really possible for one to hold a 
conception of good and a separated conception of right which may have no relation with that 
conception of good simultaneously? 
An affirmative answer is given by the liberals in today's democratic society. Indeed, 
not only Rawls, but also liberals in general，have this intention to split the conception of good 
and right into two separated fields. As MacIntyre says, "[t]his socially divorce between rules 
defining right action on the one hand and conceptions of the human good on the other is one 
ofthose aspects of such societies in virtue of which they are entitled to be called liberal."^^ 
The liberals want to do so because they admit that it is impossible to have a voluntary 
agreement on one conception ofgood in today's society (remember Rawls' suggestion of the 
burdens of judgment). We should not be coerced by others into affirming a conception of 
good or comprehensive doctrine. Thus, in ajust society, the government should not use state 
power to promote any one of the comprehensive doctrines because this is morally wrong. In 
order to regulate a well-ordered society, Rawls works out the political conception of justice 
which he thinks can best represent the moral conceptions of person and society in a modem 
democratic society. And any conception of good or comprehensive doctrine which 
transgresses its line should be rejected. 
79 "The Privatization of Good: An Liaugural Lecture", p. 3. 
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But here, the puzzling point is that, if the citizens cannot commonly agree on any 
conception of good, why can they affirm one conception of right unanimously? Why can 
they commonly agree the priority of right over good in the political aspect? 
As I have said in earlier part, if the burdens of judgment lead the citizens to disagree 
on any one of the comprehensive doctrines, it is natural that they can also lead the citizens to 
disagree on any conception of right as well as its priority. 
From this, one can easily observe that Rawls (so do other liberals) treats the 
conception of good and right in a very different way. As MacIntyre points out: 
Notice that for liberalism understood in this way everything tums on two contentions: 
first, that in the debate between particular rival and alternative conceptions of the 
human good, not only has none established a claim to decisive rational superiority 
over its rival, but that it should not even be a matter of public, as against private 
interest how we ought to proceed in evaluating the rational merits of rival claims in 
this area; and second that rational agreement on moral rules can be...somehow or 
other assured in a way that deserves to secure the consent and compliance of all 
rational persons, and that this agreement is available or can be made available as a 
key point of reference in public debate and decision making^ 
MacIntyre tells us that liberalism on one facet holds that there is no common 
agreement on any one of the comprehensive doctrines or the conceptions of good in a 
modem democratic society. But interestingly, on the other facet, it insists that a common 
agreement on the priority of right is possible, at least in the political aspect. 
In other words, for a liberal, although there is no consensus on any conception of 
good in one's private life, as a rational and reasonable citizen, one should legitimately be 
s° n^id, p. 5, italics added. 
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required to abide by the liberal moral rules in the public realm. In this way, using 
81 
MacIntyre's term, the “good has been privatized". 
However, as MacIntyre suggests, it is rather doubtful if it is really plausible for all 
citizens to share the idea of moral mle in the same way but not the same conception of good 
(even though the moral rules are limited in the public realm). This view is problematic 
because if one holds some kind of conception of good which is incompatible with Rawls' 
principles of justice (conception of right), how can he interpret the latter as worthy of 
supporting? As MacIntyre tells us explicitly, "Adequate knowledge of moral rules is 
inseparable from and cannot be had without genuine knowledge ofhuman good".^^ Without a 
conception of good, one cannot even give a substantial ground in supporting any conception 
of right. Before one can affirm some kinds of moral mle, he must be able to interpret why 
such rules are worth advocating.^^ But obviously, this can only be done through one's own 
conception of good. 
MacIntyre's illustrates his claim with the phenomenon of lying. In today's democratic 
society, honesty is somehow a shared moral maxim for everyone. However, how to interpret 
this rule can lead to serious disagreement. Firstly, although the citizens share this maxim, 
they have no agreement on what situations this maxim can be violated. For example, if there 
is a man lying for the lives of many people in a war, is it permissible? In fact, as 
demonstrated by MacIntyre, there are many cases in which the citizens may have different 
judgments on whether it is acceptable to lie if they are holding different conceptions of good. 
81 Jbid, p. 4. 
82 Jbid, p. 2. 
831 must note that the term ‘before，in this sentence is somehow misleading. In fact, according to MacIntyre, the 
relation between moral rules and conception of good is dialectical. As he says, "Each of us leams how to 
articulate his or her own initial inner capacity for comprehending what the good is in the course of also learning 
from others about rules and about virtues, so that, through a dialectical process of questioning the ways in which 
rules, virtues, goods, and the good are interrelated, we gradually come to understand the unity of the deductive 
structure ofpractical reasoning." ^ id , p. 2. 
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This is equal to saying that they have no agreement on what the exceptions should be even 
though they share the same moral ideas. 
Secondly, even if the citizens can all agree on some kinds of lie as impermissible, 
there will still be disagreement on how serious the offense is. They do not know how to rank 
the offenses of lie according to the seriousness because they have no common agreement on 
it. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that they can agree on these two cases, they will still 
disagree on how to treat the liar. Is it suitable to put him in jail or use fine? Should the 
offender be forgiven and in what ways should he be forgiven? It seems that these questions 
R4 
result in serious disagreements as well. 
In this simple demonstration, one can observe that in a pluralistic society, it is not 
easy to reach a common agreement on moral rules. This is not because the citizens have no 
method to reach agreement. Rather, it is because they have "too many such methods, each of 
them incompatible in important ways with some of the others, not only in the type of 
argument proposed as appropriate for settling disputes about the nature and content of moral 
rules, but also in the substantive conclusions arrived at about the nature and content of such 
mles.',85 These methods come firom different views on what human good is. 
In other words, the citizens have no consensus on the moral rules because their own 
conceptions of good are conflicting with one another. It seems that they are hopeless to 
affirm a common moral rule in the same way provided that they have different conceptions 
of good. And this is why one can easily observe from a modem democratic society that, 
when the citizens debate about their shared moral rules and the way these rules should be 
treated, they cannot escape from debating about the appropriate conception of good for a 
human being. 
84 Jbid, p. 7. 
85 K)id,p.5. 
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In fact, not only lying, but many other moral rules appear to have the same problem, 
that is, even if all share the similar idea in those rules, it seems that people share them in a 
different way. There is no common agreement on how these rules should be carried out or 
what should be counted as an exception. 
The problem is much more obvious when one has to determine moral rules in the 
public realm. It is likely that disagreements are unavoidable because one cannot appeal to his 
own conception of good in today's liberal society. Thus, there are intractable disputes on 
whether abortion or special sexual orientations are permissible. 
According to MacIntyre, some public questions like abortion or how to distribute 
resources between the young and the old has no commonly agreed solution because "the 
privatization of the good thus ensures not only that we are deprived of adequately 
determinate shared moral rules, but that central areas of moral concem cannot become the 
subject of anything like adequate public shared systematic discourse or enquiry".^^ If there is 
no conception of good or comprehensive doctrine which can be publicly justified, it appears 
that there is no conception of right is publicly justifiable as well. This is because the citizens 
have no commonly agreed resources which can be used to justify the conception of right. 
Thus, it is crystal clear that even if the citizens are really capable of sharing the two 
principles of justice or respecting the political virtues in the political aspect, they cannot 
share the principles or respect the virtues independently of their own comprehensive doctrine 
or conception of good. But if they can only do so in the light of their own conceptions of 
good, it is seemingly that they cannot affirm the priority of right in the same way as Rawls 
does. 
This leads to a predicament because "[f]or what we genuinely share in the way of 
moral maxims, precepts, and principles is insufficiently determinate to guide action and what 
86 Jbid, p. 10. 
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is sufficiently determinate to guide action is not shared".^^ This tells us that those principles 
or moral rules which can be "shared by all，，cannot be used to guide our action. Even if we 
accept certain moral conception, we will interpret it in various way. At last, it is our own 
conception of good which guides our action. We have no idea on how to lead a valuable life 
if appealing to the conception of right only. We have to rely on our own conception of good 
which is not commonly shared when we really want to achieve a valuable goal. This is why I 
deeply believe that if the good needs to be privatized, right cannot avoid privatizing too. 
Hence, I agree that MacIntyre is right in pointing out a fatal problem of liberalism. It 
is a self-cheating point: Liberalism wants the citizens in a modem democratic society to 
affirm its moral rules in the political aspect on the one hand but admits that they need not 
affirm its conception of good (like those of autonomy) on the other. This is impossible since 
one cannot interpret the moral rules as worthy to affirm if not appealing to a conception of 
good. However, as the liberals assert all the time, there is no common agreement on one 
conception of good, not even though the liberal one. Thus, if one appeals to his own 
conception of good, there is no guarantee that he will accept the liberal moral rules in the 
same way as a liberal does. Only when one is holding a liberal conception of good is he able 
to affirm the moral rules set out by liberalism. Therefore, I believe that at last, only the 
liberals would find the privatization of good convincing. 
All in all, if it is really hopeless for all reasonable citizens to affirm the same 
conception of good, then the affirmation ofthe priority of right, even though it is affirmed in 
the political aspect, is merely an illusion. And this is why Rawls fails to realize his ambition 
eventually. 
87 Jbid, p. 6. 
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iii. Schizophrenia 
Besides, there is another reason for me to believe that the citizens cannot always 
respect the political virtues in case of conflict. Indeed, I think it is impossible for one to split 
his identity into two parts (political and non-political). Imagine if this is possible, what will 
such a person be? 
As showed in the previous part, Rawls has not convincingly shown why the political 
virtues can always outweigh the non-political ones. Thus, he argues in vain for the priority of 
right because the virtue of reasonableness may not be able to outweigh our own conception of 
good in our daily life. 
Moreover, even if Rawls can successfully argue for the priority of right, one should 
ask if it is really possible to achieve his demand. Can one really split himself into two parts, 
one being political in that he abides by the political conception of justice and puts deeply held 
comprehensive conviction into bracket, while the other being non-political in that he can 
freely pursue one's conception of good? Is it really reasonable and possible for one to 
distinguish between these two aspects and adopt two different attitudes towards the 
questions? 
Here, one should bear in mind the relationship between the priority of right and the 
priority of public. I believe Galston is right in asserting that Rawls' priority of the right has 
been revised as the "priority ofthe public". As he points out: 
I f t h e teleological component Rawls ' s theory is so enhanced, then what of the much-
discussed priority o f t h e right over the good? The answer, I think, is that the priority of 
the right is subtly reinterpreted as the priority of the public over the nonpublic. That 
is, permissible conceptions of the good are delimited by the determination to give 
priority to social cooperation. Over and over again in his recent writings, Rawls 
repeats his hope that, taking as his point of departure the core concept of a fair system 
of cooperation, he can arrive at an expression of political values that 'normally 
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88 
outweigh whatever other values may oppose them.'" 
Galston clearly points out the difference between traditional liberalism and political 
liberalism. That is, the priority of right has been 'reinterpreted' as the priority of the public 
over the non-public. Now, the priority of right in political liberalism only demands the 
citizens to respect the political conception ofjustice in the political aspect while they can still 
freely pursue our conception of good in the non-political aspect. Thus, to say that Rawls is 
successful in arguing for the priority of right is equal to asserting that he is successful in 
arguing for the priority of the political aspect over the non-political one (as well as the 
possibility oftheir separation). 
However, quite apparently, the basic question here is that, is it really possible for the 
"individuals to make sacrifices of their core commitments and of aspects of their character 
they regard as basic to their identity and integrity"^^ voluntarily when considering political 
questions? I believe that this requirement is unrealistic and unreasonable (I have shown why 
it is unreasonable in the previous parts. I am now discussing why it is unrealistic). 
Can one really on one hand devote everything to his religion but on the other hand put 
his deeply held religious convictions into bracket when tackling political problems? For 
instance, there is a man who deeply believes that women are created by his God as the 
helpers of men. And thus, he believes that men has special ability and privileges which are 
not shared by the women. Can he really respect all citizens (especially women) as free and 
equal in a democratic society? Can he agree that all women share the same basic liberties as 
he does? His answer will obviously be ‘no’. 
This tells us that to be a normal person, it appears to be impossible for one to hold 
some kind of comprehensive doctrine in his private life but abandon them in the political 
88 "Pluralism and Social Unity", p. 718，emphasize added. 
89 ftid. 
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aspect. If one can really do that, he may suffer psychological pain. If Rawls wants to argue 
for the possibility of the split of our political and non-political identity, he must show in 
detail why a normal person can split his identity in a way described by him without having 
psychological problems. 
But unfortunately, I cannot find his argument concerning this problem in PL. He 
seems to ignore this problem. I believe that this is because his idea of citizen only includes 
those who hold ‘reasonable，doctrines. They are reasonable citizens in the sense that they 
endorse the fundamental ideas in the political conception of justice. Thus, there is no need to 
tackle the problem of conflict seriously because the political conception of justice is 
acceptable to them and being treated as compatible with different comprehensive doctrines 
(as he says, the conflicts are "much reduced"). 
However, since a modem democratic society is pluralistic in nature, Rawls must 
consider seriously the situation of those who hold comprehensive doctrines which are 
incompatible with the political conception of justice. He must take the charge of 
'schizophrenia，into account. Indeed, some people like Dworkin think that Rawls' demand 
for the reasonable overlapping consensus is unrealistic simply because the citizens will be led 
to ‘schizophrenia，finally. As he points out: 
Liberalism apparently asks us to ignore instincts and attitudes on political occasions 
that are central to the rest of our lives. It insists that we distribute our concem with 
fine equality, that we care no more about a brother than a stranger, that we banish the 
special allegiances we all feel to family or specialized community or neighborhood or 
institution. It asks us to put our most profound and powerful convictions, about 
religious faith and moral virtue and how to live, to sleep. Liberalism therefore seems a 
politics of ethical and moral schizophrenia., it seems to ask us to become, in and for 
politics, people we cannot recognize as ourselves, special political creatures wholly 
different from ordinary people who decide for themselves, in their ordinary lives, what 
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to be and what to praise and whom they love.^ ^ 
Rawls' theory asks the citizens to abandon their firmly held comprehensive 
convictions when settling basic political questions, it results in what Dworkin calls 
schizophrenia. To be an ‘ordinary’ person, can the citizens really achieve this special 
demand? Can a pious believer who wholeheartedly devotes everything to his religion puts his 
comprehensive doctrine to sleep when considering political questions? If he can really do 
this, I think one should doubt how 'pious' this man is. 
Furthermore, even if this is possible, one should ask whether it is desirable. Is it really 
desirable to abandon the comprehensive convictions or put them to sleep in the political 
aspect? In order to answer this question, what values should one appeal to? 
If one appeals to his own comprehensive doctrine, it seems that the answer is ‘no,. If 
Rawls thinks that the answer is yes, he must show why people holding different conceptions 
of good should affirm his political conception ofjustice (the priority of right) in a way which 
is independent of any comprehensive doctrine (especially liberal one). And more importantly, 
he must also explain why they should suppress their own comprehensive doctrines for the 
political conception of justice. But as I have demonstrated earlier, Rawls fails to argue for 
these two points successfully. And thus, he gives us no convincing reason to believe that it is 
desirable to affirm the political conception of justice and suppress one's own comprehensive 
doctrines in the political aspect. This eventually makes me doubt if the reasonable 
overlapping consensus is really valuable to a the citizens (especially non-liberals) in a 
democratic society. 
90 Foundations of Liberal Equality^ p. 15. Italics added. 
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iv. The impossibility of toleration as a political virtue 
(i) Why should we tolerate? 
In this part, I would like to focus on one of the political virtues which is the main 
reason of why the stability of a well-ordered society can be sustained, namely, the virtue of 
toleration. If the citizens in a democratic society do not accept the virtue of toleration, the 
overlapping consensus may at best be a mere modus vivendi and the realization of a well-
ordered society is an illusion only. 
Bear in mind that the three points discussed above are the reasons why the political 
virtues cannot override the comprehensive doctrine. They can explain why the virtue of 
toleration cannot win in case of conflict. I will further explore why the citizens, as a normal 
people, cannot respect the virtue of toleration on the one hand and yet hold a comprehensive 
doctrine which may conflict with it on the other. 
Actually, toleration is an interesting concept. In ancient time，there is almost no 
discussion on toleration as a ‘virtue，at all. One can find discussion on the virtue of courage 
or prudence, but one can hardly find a view which treats toleration as a virtue. This is because 
toleration itself is hard to be counted as something good in ancient time. When one tolerates, 
one is tolerating something that he does not agree with, usually something evil according to 
oneself. Ask yourself sincerely, how can a tolerant attitude towards a bad thing be treated as a 
virtue? This is a difficult concept because it involves ideas which are not compatible.^^ 
Nevertheless, in today's democratic society, toleration is practised in many fields like 
those of race, sex, religion or education because of its pluralistic feature. If toleration cannot 
be practised in a large scale, it seems that the society's stability will be threatened. This is 
why toleration is treated as a virtue by many people (especially the liberals) nowadays. 
Without it, a pluralistic society seems unable to survive for such a long time. 
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Here, one can easily observe that in order to treat toleration as a virtue, there must be 
a presupposition, namely, something good can result from the practice of toleration, and this 
good thing is the stability of a democratic society. 
However, why should the citizens accept stability as a good which can override their 
opinions or conceptions of good? If they affirm this due to their own comprehensive 
doctrines, does it mean that the political conception of justice involves some kinds of 
comprehensive doctrine again? Furthermore, even if they can affirm it in such a way, it seems 
that there is no reason why they cannot accept a modus vivendi since it can also be a stable 
society, though not stable in a right way according to Rawls. 
Therefore, Rawls cannot argue for the toleration as a political virtue based on the 
good of stability alone. Instead, he has to show further that the principle of toleration, the 
"central component of the overlapping consensus" is somehow "intrinsically right" ^^  which 
can be presented as independent of any comprehensive doctrine. 
Actually, Rawls surely admits that the virtue of toleration is somehow intrinsically 
right and his admission does not depend on any one ofthe comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, 
according to him, the answer to why we should tolerate is due to the recognition of the 
burdens ofjudgment. However, one may still remember that even if we recognize the burdens 
ofjudgment, it does not entail that it is reasonable for us to tolerate. This recognition results 
in the reasonableness of toleration only when it is combined with the liberal ideas of person 
and society: because we are free and equal, though you do not agree with me (due to the 
burdens of judgment), I admit that I should not force you to accept my view. 
In other words, if Rawls wants to argue that one should accept toleration as a political 
virtue, he must at first argue that one should accept the liberal ideas of person and society. 
91 Please refer to Bemard Williams, “ Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?" in Toleration. 
92 Jean Hampton, "Should Political Philosophy Be Done without Metaphysics?" in The Liberalism-
Communitarian ism Debate, p. 164. 
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But as I have shown, he fails to do so. Thus, it seems that he is unsuccessful in arguing that 
we should accept the principle of toleration as well. 
Nonetheless, there may be another way which he can adopt. It is well known that 
traditional liberalism advocates toleration because of its devotion to the good of autonomy. In 
other words, the good of autonomy is the basis of toleration for liberalism in general. And of 
course, Rawls shares this view too, though the autonomy for him is political in nature. 
For a liberal, one should treat autonomy as good because people have the right to 
decide their own ways of life independently of external force. The necessary condition for a 
valuable life is to freely choose one's own way to live. In order to achieve this, one should 
tolerate and respect others' choice of their own comprehensive doctrines. If one does not 
tolerate those who holds incompatible comprehensive doctrines with him (perhaps he uses 
force to ban some people from choosing some kinds of comprehensive doctrines), it is 
obvious that he has violated their autonomy and this is unacceptable to a traditional liberal. 
Rawls' idea of autonomy differs from the traditional one because he has to try his best 
to avoid comprehensive elements. His idea of autonomy is political: 
This values (of autonomy) may take at least two forms. One is political autonomy, the 
legal independence and assured political integrity of citizens and their sharing with 
other citizens equally in the exercise of political power. The other form is moral 
autonomy expressed in a certain mode of life and reflection that critically examines 
our deepest ends and ideals, as in Mil l ' s ideal of individuality, or by following as best 
one can Kant ' s doctrine of autonomy. While autonomy as a moral value has an 
importance place in the history of democratic thought, it fails to satisfy the criterion of 
reciprocity required of reasonable political principles and cannot be part of a political 
conception. Many citizens of faith reject moral autonomy as part of their way of life. 
(PL, pp. xliv-xli, parenthesis added) 
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Because many “citizens of faith reject moral autonomy as part of their way of life", 
Rawls changes his standpoint and tries to assert the good of autonomy in the political aspect 
only. With the intention of realizing the political autonomy, one should respect and tolerate 
others as equal (share political power) and free (legal independence) as himself. Thus, people 
should not force others to affirm their views in the political aspect. 
Unluckily, it is easy to observe from this passage that, at last, if Rawls bases the 
principle of toleration on political autonomy, he must argue for the reasonableness in 
accepting the liberal ideas of person as free and equal as well. Thus, once again, the road is 
blocked. Nevertheless, I will show in the following that even if one accepts the principle of 
toleration because of the good of autonomy, one may not be able to tolerate in many 
situation. 
(ii) The virtue oftoleration? 
Before we proceed, we should first clarify the meaning of "toleration as a virtue". 
What is it exactly? 
93 
One should bear in mind that this virtue is neither indifference nor compromise. It is 
not indifference because if one is indifferent to comprehensive doctrines, he needs not 
tolerate them at all because he does not care which doctrine is true. If toleration is needed, 
there must be something one cannot agree with. This is why Horton thinks that the main 
theme of liberalism, namely, the principle ofneutrality, somehow makes the term (toleration， 
lose its real meaning because there is no need for toleration if it can really be neutral to 
different doctrines: 
93 For details, please refer to the introduction (by David Heyd) in Toleration. 
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If it is only possible to be tolerant toward what is in some respect negatively valued, 
the very capaciousness of liberal neutrality could present conceptual difficulties to 
characterizing it as tolerant. Whereas the first charge against liberalism was that it is 
less tolerant than it pretends because it is less permissive, the second charge is that it is 
less tolerant (though not therefore intolerant) precisely because it is so permissive. 
These charges are to some extent directed at different forms of liberalism, but, taken 
together, they suggest that it might be surprisingly difficult to vindicate liberalism's 
claims to be especially tolerant: liberalism inclines toward either intolerance or 
indifference.94 
Although Horton thinks that "liberalism inclines toward either intolerance or 
indifference", Rawls holds both the principles of neutrality and toleration at the same time. 
Indeed, Rawls does not think the overlapping consensus is indifferent because if it is so, it 
will make the political conception of justice contradict some comprehensive doctrines.^^ For 
him, the principle of neutrality is somehow different from indifference and thus, it is 
compatible with the principle oftoleration. 
Secondly, the virtue of toleration is not a compromise either. As I have said in (I), 
Rawls thinks that a society sustained by a compromise is merely a modus vivendi. This is not 
the society he wants. He wants people to practise toleration on the ground of virtue rather 
than practical considerations. 
Apart from these two points, we should clarify the degree of the toleration too.^^ In 
our common usage ofthe term ‘toleration，，the degree is vague and thus, no clear-cut line can 
be drawn. When facing other attitudes which we find offensive, what action we take should 
be counted as tolerant? 
Ofcourse, avoiding the use of force is the typical case of toleration. However, is this a 
full account of it? It seems that toleration is more than this. In fact, in our everyday use, it has 
94 John Horton, "Toleration as a Virtue" in Toleration, p. 36. 
''PL, pp. 150-154. 
96 Toleration is often a matter of degree. Please refer to "Toleration as a virtue" in Toleration, p. 28. 
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various meanings. The vagueness of the term explains why there is always disagreement in 
what should be counted as toleration.^^ 
Hence, it is better for us to simply adopt the degree of the toleration according to 
Rawls. That is, broadly speaking (not restrict to political aspect only), one is tolerant 
provided that he does not use force to make others agree with him or restrict them from doing 
something he does not agree with.^^ 
Now, let us come to the question of whether it is reasonable and possible to tolerate. 
As I have mentioned, the concept of"toleration as a virtue" is quite special. Some may doubt 
if we can base the practice of toleration mainly or necessarily on this virtue. As Bemard 
William says: 
A tolerant attitude (towards this group) is any disposition or outlook that encourages 
them to do so...One possible basis of such an attitude - but only one- is a virtue of 
toleration, which emphasises the moral good involved in putting up with beliefs one 
finds offensive. I am going to suggest that this virtue. • .limits the range ofpeople who 
can possess it. Because of this, it is a serious mistake to think that this virtue is the 
only, or perhaps the most important, attitude on which to ground practices of 
toleration.99 
Williams thinks that though one can tolerate on the ground of virtue, this is not 
necessary since there are many other views that may result in the practice of toleration too 
(like Hobbesian view or skepticism). Moreover, toleration as a virtue demands people to 
accept wholeheartedly some things which they may treat as thoroughly bad. This limits the 
97 "Toleration as a virtue" is a paper demonstrating very well the debate between different philosophers on the 
meaning of ‘toleration’. 
98 Here, the term 'force' of course is vague. It cannot cover all cases of toleration. For example, if a mother 
restricts her son from making friends with a girl by not giving him money, it is unclear that this should be 
counted as intolerance. In this case, maybe most of us will think that the mother is not a tolerant person. 
However, for simplicity, I just focus on the most obvious case in this thesis, that is, the use offorce. This is 
because if it is not reasonable to tolerate in such obvious cases, then, toleration is surely not reasonable in other 
moderate cases. 
99 "Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?" in Toleration, p. 19. 
81 
^^^^ •^^^^^^^^•^^^^^•^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^•^^^^^^^ •^^^^M^^^^^^^^^^^^^•^^^^^^^M^^^^^^^l•^^^^^^^«^^^•^•^^^^^^^^^•^ W^B•^•^•^ u^w_•Muu^^^^^¾yp¾l^3[^[；7fp^jfl^^ BB^^^¾¾^¾j^^ BraM丨丨N"IWIHI_丨>丨l__丨_丨w^lMl_l丨丨__M•l__ i i 
Whv not Political Liberalism Bv Ting-Yat Chui 
range of people who can practise this virtue because there may be some who do not accept 
autonomy as good at all. This shows us why the practice of toleration cannot mainly be 
grounded on the virtue. As he says: 
If toleration as a practice is to be defended in terms of its being a value, then it will 
have to appeal to substantive opinions about the good, in particular the good of 
individual autonomy, and these opinions will extend to the value and the meaning of 
personal characteristics and virtues associated with toleration, just as they will to the 
political activities of imposing or refusing to impose various substantive outlooks. 
This is not to say that the substantive values of individual autonomy are misguided or 
baseless. The point is that these values, like others, may be rejected, and to the extent 
that toleration rests on those values, then toleration will also be rejected. The practice 
of toleration cannot be based on a value such as individual autonomy and also hope to 
escape from substantive disagreements about the good. This really is a contradiction, 
because it is only a substantive view of goods such as autonomy that could yield the 
value that is expressed by the practices oftoleration.^^^ 
From this passage, one can see that, for him, it is quite impossible to reject the good 
of autonomy on the one hand but exercise the virtue of toleration on the other hand. If one 
can exercise this virtue, one must assert the moral value of toleration through the assertion of 
the good of autonomy at the very beginning. However, since there is no hope for all to hold 
the good of autonomy (as asserted by liberals, there is no hope for universal affirmation of 
any particular conception of good), it seems that it is impossible to practise the virtue of 
toleration in a large scale in a pluralistic democratic society because not all citizens recognize 
the good of autonomy. 
But as I have said above, with the purpose of avoiding the affirmation of the liberal 
comprehensive doctrine, Rawls changes the nature of autonomy to political. Nonetheless, I 
1°° n>id, pp. 24-25, italics added. 
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have also shown that this does not work, and so Rawls cannot impose a moral responsibility 
on the citizens to accept the principle of toleration. 
Furthermore, I believe that even if one can affirm the good of political autonomy, one 
may not agree that it is possible to tolerate all the time in the political aspect. This is because 
even for those who affirm the good of autonomy, it may not be possible for them to affirm it 
as the highest good/^^ For instance, to be a normal person, it is quite impossible for us to 
accept that the life of a drug addict is a valuable one even though it is freely chosen by a 
mature adult. In the same way, even i f aDad accepts that it is good for his children to choose 
his own way to live, he may not be able to tolerate a homosexual behaviour which is chosen 
by his children. 
This is why there are laws in a democratic society which are used to ban some kinds 
of action which are morally unacceptable to the majority even though they do not violate the 
harm principle. Indeed, paternalism has never disappeared in human history because people 
do not accept that autonomy is really the highest good for human beings. This shows us one 
thing that, even if autonomy is accepted as something good, the choices must to some extent 
be limited by some acceptable conceptions of good. If this is not the case, force may be used. 
Thus, if one holds a conception of good which is not acceptable to the others who 
affirm the good of autonomy, the latter may also not be able to tolerate even though he 
affirms autonomy as good. This is why I doubt if the good of autonomy can be the highest 
good to a liberal. I f I am right, even ifthe good of autonomy is held by majority, it is hard to 
argue for the practice of toleration in large scale based on the autonomy (no matter moral or 
political). This is because although some can hold it as good, they may not hold it as the 
highest good at all. 
101 This idea in fact is inspired by Mr. Chow Po Chung. 
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Apart from that, one can easily observe that the impossibility of toleration as a virtue 
is especially obvious in the religious aspect. Although there may be some moderate religions 
like Buddhism which are relatively easier to practise toleration, there are indeed many 
religions which are hard to do so. 
In many revealed religions, their members believe that they are the only people who 
hold the truth. If others do not recognize this, they are evil. Moreover, they may also think 
that to tolerate a wrong or fake 'tmth' is evil too. Error indeed is intolerable in many 
religions. As Avishai Margalit says: 
Suppose we have a crystal ball that tells us medical truths and suggests treatments 
methods. If the goal is curing people, an error in treatment resulting from not relying 
on the crystal ball would be a foolish act that should not be respected from any point 
of view. If, on the other hand, it is scientific medicine that is in question, then error in 
theory or treatment could still be considered rational.. .When truth is given by 
revelation, or when medicine is a crystal-ball practice, errors are not a constitutive 
element in attaining truth, Errors have no value, and when they occur in a way of life, 
or in medical treatment, they become sins,? 
This passage show us an extremely important point. In religion, there is no room for 
errors or elements which are incompatible with the religion itself. Religion is different from 
science or academic research. If one really believes in the revelations ofhis religion，how can 
he accept that the revelation may be wrong? It is 'faith' but not ‘belief which is required in 
religion. If errors occur in a way oflife of a religious believer, they become sins. 
Thus, if a religion tells its believers that it is better for one to die i fhe does not accept 
its salvation (remember militant Islam), how can the believers endorse the political 
conception ofjustice as well as the principle of toleration even though it is only used in the 
102 See Avishai Margalit, "The Ring: On Religious Pluralism" in Toleration, p. 156. 
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political aspect? How can they tolerate the 'evils' around them especially when their family 
or someone they love are involved? 
Owing to this, I want to claim that if one has held no religious doctrine, he may accept 
or be affected by the norms or the prevailing ideas in a society much more easily. 
Nevertheless, when one is endorsing some kind of religion and the political virtues conflict 
with his religious beliefs, it is far from being true that the non-political value will normally be 
outweighed by the political virtues, though they are essential to the fair social-condition. 
Moreover, force may be needed in destroying the ‘evil，in this world and this may appear as 
• • 103 
quite reasonable for those who really believe in such a religion. 
As Sandel rightly asks, “What guarantees that no moral or religious doctrine can 
generate interests sufficiently compelling to burst the brackets, so to speak, and morally 
outweigh the practical interest in social cooperation?，’】^ lt is too optimistic if not 
unreasonable to claim that the political virtues may normally win whenever conflicts occur. 
At last, Rawls can at best assert unreasonably that those who do not accept his political 
conception ofjustice are unreasonable. 
Maybe he can still insist that it is possible for the virtue of toleration to be practised 
only on the political aspect but not the private life which seems much easier to achieve. This 
view is also held by many people. As Scanlon tells us that there may be someone who holds 
this view: 
Even though we disagree, they are as fully members of society as I am. They are as 
entitled as I am to the protections of the laws, as entitled as I am to live as they choose 
1031 want to mention that I have watched a TV program in which a Palestinian Bomber who bombed a crowded 
place in Israel has been interviewed. Many Israelis have been killed in the blast. However, he showed no feeling 
ofregret even though the interviewer told him that there were many women and children being killed. This is 
because he believed that his religion called him to do so and he could enter heaven even though he would die in 
such an event. This really shocked me. I of course believe that he is wrong and unreasonable. But I do not think 
that he can be convinced by us because ofhis deep devotion to his religion. 
104 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy 's Discontent (Cambridge; Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 
19. 
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to live. In addition (and this is the hard part) neither their way of living nor mine is 
uniquely the way of our society. These are merely two among the potentially many 
different outlooks that our society can include, each of which is equally entitled to be 
expressed in living as one mode of life that others can adopt. If one view is at any 
moment numerically or culturally predominant, this should be determined by, and 
dependent on, the accumulated choices of individual members of the society at 
large.io5 
This is a typical view held by the one who admits that we should tolerate. How can 
we achieve this? For a religious believer, it is quite unreasonable and impossible to do so. 
However, some people like Heyd think that we can do this if we hold a special attitude on the 
virtue of toleration. That is, when we consider whether we should tolerate him, we should 
treat the person (who holds a different doctrine from us) and his view separately. If we can 
really do this, although we may to a large extent disagree with one's opinions, we can tolerate 
him. It is because he is as equal and free as us no matter what his view is. This special nature 
of toleration is called "perceptual virtue" by Heyd, This is due to the shifting of the 
perception of toleration: 
The conception I wish to outline can be called "perceptual." It treats toleration as 
involving a perceptual shift: from beliefs to the subject holding them, or from actions 
to their agent... The virtue of tolerance consists in a switch of perspective, a 
transformation of attitude, based not on the assessment of which reasons are 
overriding but on ignoring one type of reason altogether by focusing on the other. 
Thus, to be tolerant one must be able to suspend one's judgment of the object, to tum 
one's view away from it, to treat it as irrelevant, for the sake of a generically different 
perspective. It is a kind of Gestalt switch, which like the rabbit-duck case, involves on 
the one hand a choice, sometimes an intentional effort, and on the other hand an 
"image" that is always exclusive of its competing image at any given time/°^ 
105 T. M. Scanlon, "The Difficulty ofTolerance" in Toleration, p. 231. 
106 "Introduction" in Toleration, p. 11. 
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I agree with Heyd in pointing out the necessary condition for toleration to be a virtue. 
That is，we can have the virtue of toleration only when we can treat the dissident separately 
from their views. But I don't agree that as a normal person, we can achieve what he says. Can 
we really separate a person from the views he holds in such a way? I believe this is possible 
only when we do not care about opinions of others, i.e. when they do not affect us or those 
we care. If it is not the case, it is quite impossible and unreasonable for us to hold a 
perceptual virtue of toleration. 
We can hold toleration in the case of Gestalt switch or rabbit-duck picture just 
because we do not care what exactly they are. The results have no effect on us. But it is 
extremely unlikely that we can tolerate our son from taking drug or our own religious 
doctrines being violated. This is because we believe what we hold is true. When others' 
wrong opinions affect us or the ones we love, it is reasonably unacceptable. And we would 
not hesitate in using force to stop it from happening. 
Moreover, our situation in a society also makes the perceptual virtue of toleration 
difficult to realize. We are normal human beings, we have relationships with others in a 
society. When we make friends with someone, we are not making friends with an 
unencumbered self. We cannot simply treat him and his views separately. We accept his 
ideas, comprehensive doctrine, goals, personality, which form a whole unity. I fwe can make 
friends with a bare ‘self which contains none of the above, it is far from clear what our 
‘friend’ really is. Even though we can do so, I doubt if it is worthy. 
Indeed, living in a society, we want to seek recognition from others. We hope others 
enjoy what we enjoy, like what we like. Usually, the reason of intolerance is not that we are 
holding special religious doctrine or we have the desire to dictate others. Instead, it may be 
because we discover that our society has some popular ideas which are unacceptable to us, or 
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we find out that we share no common value with others. We like to live in a society in which 
people share more or less the same interests or habits. As T. M. Scalon rightly points out: 
We all have a profound interest in how prevailing customs and practices evolve. 
Certainly, I myself have such an interest, and I do not care whether other people, 
individually, go swimming in the nude or not, but I do not want my society to become 
one in which nude bathing becomes so much the norm that I cannot wear a suit 
without attracting stares and feeling embarrassed. I have no dictate what others, 
individually, in couples or in groups, do in their bedrooms, but I would much prefer to 
live in a society in which sexuality and sexual attractiveness, of whatever kind, was 
given less importance than it is in our society today. I do not care what others read and 
listen to, but I would like my society to be one in which there are at least a significant 
number of people who know and admire the same literature and music that I do, so 
that that music will be generally available, and so that there will be others to share my 
sense of its values^ 
Thus, I may not be able to tolerate if my society is a place where nude bathing 
becomes social norm or sexuality has great significance. Even i f I am not a devout believer, I 
cannot tolerate some tastes or habits which I feel unacceptable. Moreover, I hope I can share 
my values with others without feeling embarrassing or strange. I hope my interests and tastes 
can be enjoyed by others too. This is our real situation and it is exactly why we may not 
tolerate even though we are not religious believers. 
One should bear in mind that I did not claim there is no virtue of toleration in religion. 
I just doubt whether it is common enough to sustain a well-ordered society. Similar to 
Bemard Williams, I doubt if the practice of toleration can mainly be based on this virtue 
(especially in the religious aspect). Even if some are willing to tolerate conflicting views, it 
may be a compromise only. 
107 T. M. Scanlon, "The Difficulty ofTolerance” in Toleration, p. 230. 
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If it is not a compromise, it is worth doubting whether they really have faith in their 
religions. In fact, I believe that the reason for toleration among today's religions is just 
because of the lack of power to overcome others without sacrifice/^^ I also doubt if this 
situation will change in the foreseeable future. 
If the practice of toleration cannot be based mainly on this virtue, whether the 
overlapping consensus can be achieved or the stability of a well-ordered society can be 
sustained is extremely doubtM. In fact, it may merely be a modus vivendi only. The citizens 
tolerate just because no one has an absolute power which can make others obey oneself 
without serious sacrifice. 
Perhaps someone will object to my view with examples of today's religious 
toleration. For instance, recently, in Northern Ireland, there seems to be hope of peace 
because Britain agrees to grant semi-independence to them. It appears that they can tolerate 
each other because most of them detested non-ending violence. 
However, is this really toleration based on the virtue of toleration? Or is it true that it 
can be sustained in the future if the balance of the power disappears? I doubt it very much. 
Indeed, if the Christians in Britain can control Northern Ireland without sacrifice (or vice 
versa), I am afraid that they will not hesitate in doing so. And the most important thing is that 
they may consider it to be reasonable. 
This shows us one fact. The stability of a democratic society can be sustained only if 
no power is great enough to be dominant in such a pluralistic society. This may be due to the 
weakness of human nature. Such a fact, however, cannot be denied simply by superficial 
observation of the apparently harmony of the recent situation. 
Because of the above discussions, I want to declare that Rawls' work is far from being 
satisfactory in arguing for the possibility and stability (which is based on the political virtue) 
108 For the discussion ofthese points, please refer to Shih Yuan Kang, Contemporary Liberalism, pp. 174-175. 
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of a well-ordered society because the overlapping consensus is not realizable. He is too 
optimistic and unreasonable when telling us about the nature of a well-ordered society. Thus, 
at last, it can at best be an illusory fantasy of a modem liberal. 
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Conclusion 
As I have discussed in Introduction, Rawls wants to work out a political conception of 
justice which can be endorsed by all reasonable citizens in a modem democratic society 
where the reasonable pluralism is an inevitable feature. For him, this endorsement is possible 
through the reasonable overlapping consensus. If such a consensus is realized, the well-
ordered society which is regulated by the political conception of justice will be just and 
stable. This means that the task set by Rawls himself is fulfilled and the social unity of a 
well-ordered society is secured. 
In this thesis, I have argued that Rawls fails to realize his ambition. His failure is due 
to two reasons. First of all, he is not convincing in imposing a moral obligation on the 
citizens to affirm his political conception of justice. Secondly, he is unreasonable and too 
optimistic to claim that the citizens who hold different comprehensive doctrines can endorse 
such a political conception. 
He is unreasonable because he does not take the effect of the burdens of judgment 
(which are suggested by himself) into account seriously when claiming that all reasonable 
citizens can affirm his political conception of justice. Furthermore, he is not convincing in 
showing that his political conception is freestanding. 
He is too optimistic in that he declares the political virtues have the outweighing 
power when conflicting with the non-political values. I have argued that this is not the case. 
Moreover, since the possibility and stability of a well-ordered society depend heavily on the 
political virtue of toleration, this makes its realization an illusion because, as I have shown, 
toleration cannot be practised mainly on the ground of virtue. Indeed, toleration is difficult to 
be treated as a virtue for those who endorse their own religious doctrine since there is no 
room for it in many religions. 
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I f I am right, Rawls' political liberalism is unsuccessful because it fails to provide any 
realistic solution to the question it is supposed to answer. As I have mentioned, in the end, a 
well-ordered society can at best be a modus vivendi only. 
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